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Abstract

FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING OF DERIVATIVES AND THE HETEROGENEITY OF
INVESTOR BELIEFS

Jack W. Dorminey, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009

Major Director: Jayaraman Vijayakumar, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Accounting

Using a sample of 51 banking organizations, I examine the effect of the Statement
of Financial Accounting Standard 133 on the belief heterogeneity of market participants
and how this heterogeneity affects abnormal trading volume surrounding earnings
announcements. SFAS 133 is the first standard to require that all derivatives be recognized
at fair-value and that the fluctuations in derivative fair-values be reported in either net
income or other comprehensive income. The behavior of derivative instruments and the
fair-valuation and treatment prescribed by SFAS 133 are complex. Due to the underlying
complexity of both derivatives and the accounting treatment prescribed by the SFAS 133
standard, I expect that investors may have differing interpretations of the newly provided
information. My hypothesis is that the income effects arising from the fair-value

vi

accounting for derivatives (SFAS 133) are associated with an increase in differing beliefs
among individuals.
I find that the income effects of SFAS 133 are significantly and positively related
to belief heterogeneity among investors. The net income and other comprehensive income
effects of SFAS 133 are significantly and positively related to increasing levels of
abnormal trading volume surrounding earnings announcements. Additionally, levels of
SFAS 133 net income is positively and significantly associated with three measures of
belief heterogeneity derived from analysts’ forecasts. In an extended analysis I model the
SFAS 133 income effects on abnormal volume using the three belief heterogeneity
measures as the conduit. I find support for two of the three heterogeneity measures acting
as a conduit for the effect of the SFAS 133 related income measures on abnormal volume.
The results of this study indicate that, while the recognized fair-value of derivatives
is value relevant to equity prices (Ahmed, Kilic, & Lobo, 2006), the income effects of the
same financial standard causes heterogeneity in beliefs about the firm. This suggests that,
at least in the case of derivative fair-values, there exists a trade-off between value
relevance and the strength of consensus surrounding beliefs in the market.

vii

I Introduction
The promulgation of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 133
represents another significant step in the movement toward fair-value accounting. SFAS
133 requires that all derivatives be recognized (versus disclosed) at fair-value and that the
fluctuations in fair-value be reported in either net income or other comprehensive income.
Recent literature (for example, Ahmed, Kilic, & Lobo (2006)) provides evidence that the
fair-value recognitions required under SFAS 133 are value-relevant. Value relevance is
inferred from the aggregate market response operationalized as equity price reactions
surrounding SFAS 133 recognitions. Prior studies suggest that trading volume can provide
insights into the effects of information on market participants not available though an
examination of consensus valuation (price) alone (Karpoff, 1987). Price responses reflect
the aggregate market valuation whereas trading volume reflects differing beliefs, and
possible information asymmetry among individuals. This study seeks to evaluate the
possible asymmetry effect of the new standard by examining the belief heterogeneity
among investors.
Using a sample of 51 banking organizations, I examine the heterogeneity in market
participant responses to the fair-value recognitions required under SFAS 133. Under
conditions where information is commonly received, assessments of the firm value can
vary among individual market participants when they possess differential expertise in
processing the information and/or they apply different underlying assumptions in their
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interpretation of the information.1 While market forces will impound the consensus
(average) interpretation of available information into the market value of the firm, SFAS
133 recognitions may expand the range of differential valuations held by individuals
around the consensus price.2 To the extent that the new information resulting from SFAS
133 generates greater differential (heterogeneous) beliefs among market participants, the
standard may be inducing asymmetry among individuals.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has issued several standards
dealing with the valuation, disclosure, and recognition of derivative fair-values. Disclosure
of derivative information was first broadly addressed in 1990 with SFAS 105.3 SFAS 107
and SFAS 119 (issued in 1991 and 1994, respectively) expanded the guidance for adequate
disclosure of derivative information. SFAS 107 required, where practically estimable, the
disclosure of derivative fair-values. SFAS 119 required the disclosure of derivative fairvalues along with disaggregated amounts classified by type and purpose of the position.
With SFAS 133 in 1998, FASB required the recognition of derivative fair-values
either as an asset or a liability on the statement of financial position. Gains and losses on
the derivative position are handled differently depending on how the instrument is
designated. At inception, a derivative position must be designated as a fair-value hedge,
cash-flow hedge, foreign currency hedge, or a non-hedge position. In cases where the
1

Differential opinions also arise from asymmetric access to information. In this study, I assume that
information is commonly received within the event window (3 and 7 days) surrounding the announcement
date.
2
Efficient price discovery in the financial markets is a necessary and maintained assumption in this analysis.
3
SFAS 52 (1981) and SFAS 80 (1984) dealt with specific derivative instruments. Instruments not
specifically covered by these standards were generally treated in a way that was consistent with the intent of
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derivative is used as a fair-value hedge, the gain or loss on the hedge is recorded in current
earnings along with the fair-value gain or loss on the instrument being hedged. The net
result is that the ineffective portion of the hedge is reported in current period earnings.4
The gains and losses associated with cash-flow hedges are reported in current period
earnings. Alternatively, gains and losses associated with foreign currency hedges are
reported in other comprehensive income as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. If
the derivative is not used as a hedge, then the gains and losses associated with that
instrument are recorded in current period earnings. The effect of the statement is that
derivative positions are now shown in the body of the statements, thus altering the reported
position and income measures of the firm.5 The standard’s complexity and implementation
challenges have caused FASB to issue several clarifying standards and establish the
Derivatives Implementation Group to deal specifically with derivative accounting issues.6,7
Empirical studies find value-relevance (equity price and return) in the information
reported under SFAS 119 and SFAS 133. Venkatachalam (1996) examines the valuerelevance of derivative disclosures required by SFAS 119. Through a cross-sectional
analysis of banking institutions, he shows that the fair-value estimates of derivatives

these standards. Nonetheless, SFAS 105 represents the first formal broad standard that set disclosure
requirements for derivatives as a class of financial instrument.
4
The effectiveness of a hedge is the degree to which fluctuations in the fair-value of the hedged item are
offset by the hedging derivative. A perfect hedge is a situation where fluctuations in the hedged items are
exactly offset by fluctuations in the hedging derivative. The ineffective portion of a hedge is, therefore, the
amount by which the fluctuation in the hedged item is over or under the fluctuation in the hedging derivative.
5
Income measures here refers to the combined effect on Net income and Other Comprehensive Income
6
SFAS 138, 157 and 161 were all issued subsequent to SFAS 133 with the intent of clarifying SFAS133.
7
The Derivatives Implementation Group, the first of its kind, was established by FASB with the purpose of
providing ongoing guidance and consultation relative to the implementation of derivative related standards.
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(provided under SFAS 119) have a positive and significant relationship with market
valuations of the firm. Seow and Tam (2002) find that the disclosure of credit exposures
and fair-value gains and losses on derivatives required under SFAS 119 have a significant
association with equity returns. Most recently, in an examination of banks that held
derivative positions requiring disclosure under SFAS 119 and recognition under SFAS
133, Ahmed, Kilic, and Lobo (2006) find that derivative fair-value recognition exhibit a
significant positive relationship with equity valuation. They do not find significant
coefficients on disclosed derivative fair-values. In the context of the prior studies, Ahmed
et al., (2006) conclude that the disclosed derivative fair-values do not have incremental
explanatory power of equity valuations in the presence of recognized derivative fairvalues. Taken together, these studies show that derivative fair-values are relevant to equity
valuations and that the relationship between recognized derivative fair-value and equity
valuations overpowers that of disclosed derivative fair-values.
The analysis of price response thus far in the literature shows that the aggregate
market finds value-relevance in these disclosures and recognitions. Since equity price
reflects the aggregate or average market belief, changes in equity prices and abnormal
returns reflect the revision in the aggregate or average market belief (Kim & Verrecchia,
1991). However, market participant beliefs and belief revision patterns can be inferred
from an analysis of equity price and returns only if market participants are assumed to (1)
possess homogeneous prior beliefs and (2) follow a homogeneous (parallel) path of belief
revision after an announcement patterns (Karpoff, 1986).

4

An analysis of individual belief revisions is important since it shows how
consistently the information is interpreted by market participants. When interpretations
vary widely among investors, the reported information may not be clear or the ultimate
valuation effect on the firm may not be commonly understood. To the extent that the
standard is associated with widening differential beliefs among investors, the standard may
induce asymmetry in the market.
Prior work suggests that increased trading volume is observed when investors
revise their beliefs differentially (Bamber, Barron, & Stober, 1997, 1999; Karpoff, 1986;
Kim & Verrecchia, 1991). As a result, the literature suggests that both price (consensus
response) and volume reactions (belief revision response) should be examined when
investigating the effect of information flows (Bamber & Cheon, 1995; Holthausen &
Verrecchia, 1990; Morse, 1980; Ziebart, 1990). In these studies, consensus response is
inferred from observed price response, and belief revision response is inferred from
measures such as trading volume reaction, bid-ask spread, and dispersion of analysts’
forecasts.
Due to the complexity of derivative instruments, the complexity of SFAS 133,
differing capabilities and assumptions of individual investors, and the departure from
historical cost measurement, I expect that heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs surrounding
earnings announcements after the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater than before the
adoption. Further, consistent with prior literature, I expect that the increase in
heterogeneity of beliefs manifests as increased abnormal trading volume surrounding postSFAS 133 earnings announcements.
5

Using a sample of banking organizations, I examine the relationships between the
income effects of SFAS 133, three measures of investor belief dispersion identified by
Bamber et al., (1997), and three measures of abnormal trading volume. I focus on banking
organizations since it is this industry most generally affected by this standard. The analysis
centers on the adoption of SFAS 133, which occurred from 1998 through 2001. Since I am
interested in fully capturing the adoption period of SFAS 133, I collect data for the fiscal
years ending 1996 through 2003 for all firms included in the sample.
My general expectations is that SFAS 133 compliant earnings announcements
result in increased heterogeneity of beliefs and that this heterogeneity is observed as
abnormal trading volume. I first test for differences in the levels of trading volume and
belief heterogeneity between the pre-SFAS 133 and the post-SFAS 133 periods. Second, I
test for the degree of association between belief dispersion and the income effects of SFAS
133. Finally, I establish an association between belief dispersion attributable to the SFAS
133 income effect and abnormal trading volume.
I find that the income effect of SFAS 133 is significantly related to belief
heterogeneity among investors. The income and other comprehensive income effects of
SFAS 133 are significantly related to levels of abnormal trading volume surrounding
earnings announcements. Additionally, the income effect of SFAS 133 is significantly
associated with three measures of belief heterogeneity derived from analysts’ forecasts. In
an extended analysis I model the SFAS 133 income effects on abnormal volume using the
three belief heterogeneity measures as the conduit. I find only weak support for two of the
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three heterogeneity measures acting as a conduit for the effect of the income measures on
abnormal volume.
The results of this study may be informative to standard-setters as they seek to meet
the objective of providing information that is useful in making rational investment
decisions.8 To the extent that investors’ decisions seem less consistent and belief revisions
become more divergent subsequent to issuing the fair-value standard, policy makers may
need to either re-evaluate the ultimate purpose of such a standard, or evaluate the method
by which the standard is implemented. In either case, standard-setters should be concerned
not only with the consensus reaction (price) but also with the effect certain reporting has
on individual investor’s beliefs and belief revisions. Regulators may find it informative to
evaluate the effect derivative fair-value reporting has on asymmetry among investors and
the observed abnormal volume.9
This study contributes to the literature on derivative reporting by evaluating the
effect fair-value derivative reporting has on investors’ beliefs and trading volume. While
prior studies have demonstrated the value-relevance of derivative reporting through the
examination of equity prices (Ahmed et al., 2006), the literature provides no information
on how these fair-value standards affect the informational landscape for individual market
participants. Through an examination of investor belief revisions and the related trading

8

Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (FASB, 1978), states that ‘Financial reporting should
provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making
rational investment, credit, and similar decisions.’
9
In a June 2000 address to the American Conference Institute, Commissioner Laura Unger stated “... we
have to remember that information can only empower investors if they understand it and can effect apply it.
Access to information is no substitute for knowing how to interpret it.”

7

volume, I explore how belief heterogeneity may be induced by SFAS 133. Several
researchers posit that, since price and trading volume reflect different information about
the effect of announced data, value-relevance research should evaluate both price and
volume effects (Bamber & Cheon, 1995; Karpoff, 1987). Yet, no prior studies have
examined the investor belief revision and trading volume patterns associated with the
application of fair-value recognition of derivatives on financial statements.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the
literature dealing with fair-value standards, heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs, and
analysts’ forecasts. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical basis and motivation for the
hypothesis. Chapter 4 describes the methodology, empirical models, and data sources used
in, my examination. Chapter 5 presents the results of the analysis and the resultant
implications. Chapter 6 concludes the analysis and identifies the limitations of the study as
well as potential future areas of research.

8

II Literature Review
Background
There are three primary streams of research relevant to this study. The first stream
of research deals with the fair-value reporting of derivatives. Generally these studies have
provided empirical evidence that both notional and fair-value information is relevant to the
level and change in equity prices.10 Second, several studies have examined the information
contained in trading volume incremental to the information contained in valuation (equity
price and return) studies alone. These studies have generally demonstrated that where
examination of price provides information on the aggregate market response, an analysis of
trading volume yields insights into the dispersion of beliefs around the aggregate response.
The third body of research relevant to this study deals with analysts’ forecasts. These
studies examine the degree to which analyst forecast error and the dispersion of analysts’
forecasts provide insights into the clarity of the informational landscape in which
investment decisions are made. Each of these research streams is now discussed in greater
detail.

10

The notional amount (or notional principal amount or notional value) on a financial instrument is the
nominal or face amount that is used to calculate payments made on that instrument. This amount generally
does not change hands and is thus referred to as notional. In a bond, the buyer pays the principal amount at
issue (start), then receives coupons (computed off this principal) over the life of the bond, then receives the
principal back at maturity (end). In a swap (a type of derivative position), no principal changes hands at
inception (start) or expiry (end), and in the meantime, interest payments are computed based on a notional
amount, which acts as if it were the principal of a bond, hence the term notional principal amount,
abbreviated to notional.

9

Value-Relevance of Derivative Reporting
Nelson (1996) examines the usefulness of the disclosures required under SFAS 107
in assessing the market value of common equity. She finds that the fair value of securities,
whether included on the financial statements or not, was unrelated to the firm’s equity
valuations after controlling for future earnings.
In contrast to Nelson (1996), Barth (1996) finds evidence that fair-valuations
explain market valuation premiums over book values even when bank-specific effects
(regulatory capital requirements, deposit profile, etc) are included as control variables.
However, she finds that off-balance sheet items (derivatives) are not significant in
explaining the market-value versus book-value premium assigned by the market. While the
two studies conflict with regard to the relationship between equity valuation and fairvalued assets, both conclude that footnote disclosures prior to SFAS 107 did not provide
valuable information to the market.
Venkatachalam (1996) also finds that fair-value disclosure was value-relevant in
explaining the cross-sectional variation in bank stock prices. Notional amounts of the
derivative instruments also provided incremental information even in the presence of the
fair-value information. The model specification used in the study treated disclosed and
recognized information as equivalents, such that the coefficients on disclosures and
recognitions were the same. Therefore, the results of the study reflect the different valuerelevance of content (notional vs fair-value) rather than reporting method (disclosure vs.
recognition).

10

In a study of international manufacturing firms, Wong (2000), finds a positive and
statistically significant relationship between the notional derivative disclosures required
under SFAS 119 and the foreign exchange risk exposure of the firm. He concludes that
investors can use the disclosed notional information to evaluate the foreign exchange
exposure of the firm since the notional value of the firm’s derivative positions (hedges) is
related to the level of foreign exchange rate exposure.
Moses (2002) identifies the conflict in prior literature regarding the value-relevance
of fair-value disclosure (e.g. Barth et al., (1996) and Nelson (1996)) and finds that
disclosures arising from SFAS 119 are value-relevant. The valuation model employed by
Moses effectively controls for variables omitted in the literature prior to his study.
Specifically, the difference between book- and market-value is used in earlier models
without controlling for unique, firm-specific variables. Failure to control for these unique
factors may have obscured the relationship under examination and may be the reason for
the lack of significance in prior studies.
Seow and Tam (2002) also examine the value-relevance of SFAS 119 and attempt
to remedy the omitted variable problem by controlling for firm-specific market beta. In
their model, the firm-specific market beta is used to capture the firm-specific aspects not
explicitly represented in the model. The derivative fair-values reported in footnote
disclosures have a significant relationship with observed market returns for the period
following the disclosure. They conclude that SFAS 119 disclosure requirements
represented improved transparency to the investor and convey valuable information
relative to observed returns.
11

Wang, Alam, and Makar (2005) examine the value relevance of notional
disclosures required under SFAS 119 when fair-value information was also available. They
find that the value relevance of notional derivative information was robust to the inclusion
of fair-value information. In conjunction with Seow and Tam (2002), their results indicate
that both the notional and fair-value reporting of derivatives are individually and jointly
relevant for investors in evaluating future prospects of the firm.
Most recently, Ahmed et al. (2006) examine the value relevance of disclosure
versus recognition with regard to SFAS 133. Using a sample of banking organizations,
they examine the effect of SFAS 133 recognitions on the equity price level and return.
More specifically, by examining those institutions that held risk management derivatives
both before and after the adoption of SFAS 133, they are able to demonstrate the
incremental value-relevance of the post SFAS 133 recognitions. They find that while the
coefficients estimated for disclosed derivative information are not significant, the
estimated coefficients on recognized derivative information are significant. This evidence
indicates that the recognition of derivative fair-values provides value-relevant information
to market participants.
Trading Volume and Belief Heterogeneity
As early as Bachelier (1900), researchers have hypothesized that changes in price
level and changes in the level of trading volume could provide insights into different
aspects of investor opinions about firm value. Beaver (1968) claims that isolating the
volume effect is necessary to distinguish between market consensus changes and
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individuals’ expectation changes. As such, Beaver (1968) implies that volume provides
insights into the differential interpretation of information while price indicates the
consensus interpretation of information.
Karpoff (1987) in an analytical examination of trading volume, concludes that
abnormal trading volume does not necessarily imply disagreement regarding the newly
available information. He shows that identical interpretation of new information when
prior expectations were divergent could also give rise to abnormal trading as investors
revise beliefs. To the extent that investors have homogeneous priors and homogeneous
belief revisions arising from the new information, volume is merely a noisy artifact of
market dynamics and contains no information. However, when prior beliefs and revisions
are not homogeneous, volume may offer insight into the revision patterns of investors, and
therefore, the degree to which investors similarly interpret information ((Bamber et al.,
1999; Karpoff, 1987; Kim & Verrecchia, 2001).
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) introduce the notions of consensus and
informedness. Consensus refers to the level of agreement among market participants at the
release of new information, and informedness refers to the extent that participants become
more knowledgeable at the point of information release. Both effects occur at the release of
information, and the joint evaluation of price and volume reveals which of these two
effects dominate the trading environment. An increase in informedness is inferred when
the variance of unexpected price change and changes in trading volume are positively
related. When the variance of unexpected price change and changes in trading volume are
negatively related, the consensus effect dominates. This study introduces a conceptual joint
13

interpretation of price and volume effects in the trading environment, but relies on the
condition of homogeneous priors.
Ziebart (1990) finds that changes in abnormal trading volume are positively
associated with both the changes belief dispersion and the change in the aggregate belief
revision. He operationalizes belief dispersion as dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and
aggregate belief revision as the absolute value of the change in analysts mean forecast.
Both belief dispersion and aggregate belief revision are jointly significant in the
explanation of abnormal trading volume. Therefore, belief dispersion has incremental
explanatory power for abnormal trading volume even after controlling for aggregate belief
revisions.
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) find that the unexpected volume and the variance of
price change are increasing functions of the precision of the announced information and
decreasing functions of the amount of preannouncement public and private information.
Investors are diversely informed and differ in the precision of their prior information (prior
beliefs). Therefore, investors respond differently (heterogeneous belief revisions) to new
information and this leads to positive trading volume effects. They assert that trading
volume contains the differences among investors which are averaged out in the return data.
Therefore, the examination of volume information in conjunction with returns information
may identify systematic differences in investors’ knowledge or other characteristics giving
rise to different reactions across firms and types of announcements.
Abarbanell (1995) claims that inferences from studies using changes in forecast
dispersion are threatened by the failure to control for the magnitude of price changes. Since
14

the information released will likely affect both the trading volume and changes in forecast
dispersion, including the magnitude of price change in the model is necessary to isolate the
belief revision effect inferred from forecast revisions.
Bamber & Cheon (1995) investigate the relationship between the magnitude of
equity price movement and the corresponding trading volume. They find that, on average,
there exists a positive relationship between the magnitudes of price and volume reactions.
However, in approximately 25 percent of the cases, the magnitude of price movement is
different than the magnitude of volume movement. They report that the results of their
study are broadly consistent with the idea that trading volume reaction is likely high
(relative to price reaction) when the announcement generates differential belief revisions
among individual investors.
Bamber et al.,(1997) investigate three distinct aspects of investor disagreement
(heterogeneity of beliefs). They show that each of the measures (dispersion in prior beliefs,
change in dispersion, and belief jumbling) plays an incremental role in explaining investor
disagreement. Additionally, they note that each of these measures provides incremental
explanatory power for abnormal trading volume. The dispersion in prior beliefs refers to
the a priori disagreement among market participants prior to the release of new
information. Larger prior dispersion leads to greater belief revision after information
release and, therefore, larger trading volume. Belief jumbling occurs when market
participants revise beliefs differentially from other market participants. This shows that the
newly arrived information is processed and interpreted differently by individual market
participants, thus causing the formulation of differential beliefs. Under conditions of
15

jumbling, Bamber et al., (1997) found increased trading volume. Finally, the change in
dispersion reflects the extent to which beliefs are, on average diverging (versus
converging) around earnings announcements. As beliefs diverge, the degree of
disagreement is increasing, and increased trading volume is observed.
In an examination of trading volume under speculative conditions, Kandel and
Pearson (1995) show that models restricting market participants to common (or
homogeneous) interpretation of commonly received information are overly restrictive.
Along the same lines, Bamber, Barron and Stober (1999) identify two conditions under
which differential interpretations explain a significant amount of the earnings
announcement period trading volume. First, they show that trading coincidental with small
price changes reflects differential interpretation of the information by investors. Second,
differential interpretation is also significantly related to trading volume where trading
volume is higher than the firm-specific non-announcement period trading volume. This
study specifically identifies the importance of inventors’ differential priors and differential
interpretations when evaluating belief heterogeneity and its effect on trading volume.
Tkac (1999) finds that excess turnover (abnormal trading volume) is positively
related to option availability and institutional ownership. Firm size is also influential, but
the relationship was negative.
Cready and Hurtt (2002) demonstrate that volume-based metrics provide a stronger
test of investor reaction than the conventional return-based metrics. As a result, they
conclude that studies designed to detect investor response should include an examination
of both return-based and trading-based metrics.
16

Literature in this stream of research shows the importance of examining both price
and trading volume effects and how differential beliefs and belief revisions are manifest in
trading volume.
Dispersion of Analyst Forecast and Belief Heterogeneity
Dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, reflecting differential beliefs of analysts, has been
examined in prior literature (Abarbanell, 1995; Bamber et al., 1997, 1999; Chaing, 2005;
Irani & Karamanou, 2003; Rich, Raymond, & Butler, 1992). Additionally, these studies
apply the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for the general level of dispersion
(belief heterogeneity) among market participants. Daley, Senkow and Vigeland (1988)
specifically examine the use of analysts’ forecasts as an ex ante measure of aggregate
market uncertainty. They find that variance in analysts forecasts are a useful indicator of
the aggregate markets uncertainty surrounding earnings announcements.
The source of differential beliefs is unobservable and may result from asymmetrical
information and/or the differential processing of the same information (Barron, 1995; Kim
& Verrecchia, 2001). Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991) examine the relationship between
forecast dispersion and mean forecast revisions with trade volume. The results of this study
indicate a significant positive relation between the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts of
annual EPS and the volume of trading. The relationship holds even after controlling for the
volume effect of the magnitude of monthly revisions in the mean analysts forecast. That is,
even after controlling for the surprise effect of the revisions, the dispersion of forecasts (a
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proxy for heterogeneity of beliefs) provides significant explanatory power for trading
volume.
In a study of forecast dispersion and the underlying uncertainty of the forecast,
Rich et al. (1992) examine the inflation expectations of analysts. They show that the
forecast dispersion across respondents to the survey is positively and significantly
associated with the measures of inflation uncertainty. While their results are tempered with
sensitivity to the survey series used, the findings nonetheless, show that uncertainty
manifests as dispersion in analysts’ forecasts.
Barron (1995) extends the belief revision literature by isolating the differential
belief revision effect. He measures differential belief revisions as the degree to which
individual analyst forecasts are ordered (ranked) differently after the announcement than
before the announcement. Consistent with Karpoff’s (1986) supposition, Barron (1995)
found that differential prior beliefs and differential belief revisions both demonstrated
incremental explanatory power for variations in trading volume.
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) find a negative relationship between analyst
forecast dispersion and future expected returns. Similarly, Athanassakos and Kalimipalli
(2003) found that analyst forecast dispersion was related to future return volatility.
Together these studies indicate that the ex-ante uncertainty, observed ex-post as volatility
in stock return, is associated with the level of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts.
Hope (2003) found that a firm’s disclosure of accounting policy was associated
with reduced forecast dispersion. The finding suggests that as the transparency of a firm’s
reporting increases, the analysts’ uncertainty is reduced, and more common (consensus)
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forecasts are rendered. Benrud (2007) in an analytical examination of dispersion, shows
that both an increase in the cost of information and a decrease in the availability of
information give rise to increased dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, several
studies have used analyst forecasts as a proxy measure for belief heterogeneity in the
market.
The preceding streams of research provide the basis for the development of this
study’s hypotheses. In anticipation of increased belief heterogeneity induced by SFAS 133
compliant earnings announcements, I hypothesize that the income effects of SFAS 133 are
associated with increased trading volume. The hypotheses are now formally developed.

.
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III Hypothesis Development
Earnings announcements associated with SFAS 133 are expected to give rise to
differential beliefs for four primary reasons. First, derivatives may be the most complex
and least generally understood of all financial instruments. These instruments have little or
no initial cost, and yet, can represent significant claims or liabilities to the firm. Actual
performance of the derivative position is typically driven by specific contractual
arrangements sensitive to fluctuations in underlying economic conditions (e.g. interest
rates and default rates) or other performance conditions (e.g. delivery of a commodity,
default). Understanding the net position is further complicated when the derivative is a
hedge. Under hedge conditions, evaluating the true exposure of the firm requires an
understanding of the hedged item, the conditions that change its value, and the degree to
which the hedging derivative offsets the fluctuation in the hedged item. As such,
understanding the specific conditions that drive the value of a given derivative position,
and understanding the appropriate assumptions to use in assessing that derivative positions
are not trivial. Given this inherent complexity of derivatives and their use, I expect market
participants to develop differential opinions about the effect these instruments have on the
firm.
Second, the complexity of accounting treatment prescribed in the standard may
evoke differential evaluations by investors. The reporting of gains and losses on the
derivative position depends on how the derivative is designated. At inception, a derivative
position must be designated as a fair-value hedge, cash-flow hedge, foreign currency
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hedge, or non-hedge. In cases where the derivative is used as a fair-value hedge, the gain
or loss on the hedge is recorded in current earnings along with the fair-value gain or loss
on the instrument being hedged. The net result is that the ineffective portion of the hedge is
reported in current period earnings.11 The gains and losses associated with cash-flow
hedges are reported in current period earnings. Alternatively, gains and losses associated
with foreign currency hedges are reported in other comprehensive income as part of the
cumulative translation adjustment. If the derivative is not used as a hedge, then the gains
and losses associated with that instrument are recorded in current period earnings. The
effect of the statement is that derivative positions are now shown in the body of the
statements, thus altering the reported position and income of the firm. As a result, the
meaning of fluctuations in fair-value and related income effects may be unclear, causing
investors to make differential evaluations.
Third, commonly received information can, and generally is, interpreted differently
by market participants. Investors possess different evaluative capability and experience and
will apply different underlying assumptions when interpreting financial results. The
uncertainly induced by the very nature of derivatives and the complexity of the standard
may accentuate differences among investors’ interpretations. Further, given the sensitivity
of derivative fair-values to underlying assumptions and the difficulty in parsing permanent

11

The effectiveness of a hedge is the degree to which fluctuations in the fair-value of the hedged item is
offset by the hedging derivative. A perfect hedge is a situation where fluctuations in the hedged items are
exactly offset by fluctuations in the hedging derivative. The ineffective portion of a hedge is, therefore, the
amount by which the fluctuation in the hedged item is over or under the fluctuation in the hedging derivative.
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and transitory income effects from derivatives, I predict the heterogeneity in investors’
beliefs to increase after adoption of SFAS 133.
Finally, as the justification for historical cost accounting finds its roots in reliability
and freedom from bias, a departure from an historical cost basis introduces the potential for
reduced reliability and increased bias. The action by FASB following the introduction of
SFAS 133 supports this concern. To clarify SFAS 133, FASB has issued SFAS 138, SFAS
157, and SFAS 161 (issued in 2000, 2006, and 2008, respectively). All of these subsequent
standards are designed to clarify the valuation and financial accounting treatment of
derivatives prescribed in the original standard. Each of these standards specifically
addresses some aspect of SFAS 133 and provides modification or continuations of its
applicability. Additionally, due to the complexity of the issues surrounding implementation
of SFAS 133, FASB has instituted the Derivatives Implementation Group. The first of its
kind, the purpose of the group is to provide ongoing guidance and consultation relative to
the implementation of derivative related standards. The significant effort invested in
clarifying SFAS 133 shows that the promulgating body believes that the standard has the
potential to evoke inconsistent treatment and interpretation.
Ahmed et al., (2006) find that, based on observed equity prices and equity returns,
the recognitions required under SFAS 133 generated a balance sheet effect that is value
relevant.12 They find differences between the coefficient on the fair-value of disclosed
derivatives prior to SFAS 133 implementation and the coefficient on the fair-value of

12

Ahmed et al., (2006) utilize the fair-value of financial assets and the fair-value of financial liabilities as the
measure of the effect of SFAS 133. These measures will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
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recognized derivatives after SFAS 133 implementation. The current study examines the
effect of the earnings announcements under SFAS 133 on the differential beliefs of market
participants and abnormal volume. Recognizing derivatives under SFAS 133 affects both
Net Income (NI) and Other Comprehensive Income (OCI). The fair-value changes that
affect both measures of income not only have the potential for reversal in subsequent
periods, but also involve reclassification from OCI to NI under certain conditions.
Additionally, the portion of fair value changes deemed to be associated with the ineffective
portion of the hedge is not necessarily stable across time. In all of these cases, the OCI and
NI effects are dependent on the underlying assumptions employed by the preparer. Market
participants can be expected to evaluate the same information differentially and arrive at
differential conclusions regarding the prospects of the firm. As a result, the changes in the
fair-value of derivatives included in NI and OCI will be sources of differential beliefs.
Given the inherent complexity of derivative instruments, the multifaceted nature of the
standard, and the difficulty in interpreting the financial results reported under SFAS 133, I
expect that the incremental income effect of SFAS 133 is related to differential beliefs held
by market participants.
Bamber et al., (1997) identify three distinctly different aspects of differential
beliefs; prior dispersion, change in dispersion, and belief jumbling. They report that
trading volume around earnings announcements is increasing in prior dispersion, changes
in dispersion, and belief jumbling after controlling for the magnitude of the
contemporaneous price change. First, prior dispersion refers to market participants holding
different beliefs about a firm and its prospects prior to the earnings announcement. This
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pre-existing dispersion in beliefs reflects the general disagreement that exists among
investors prior to release of the new information. Upon release of the new information
beliefs will either be confirmed or refuted. Other things equal, large prior belief dispersion
will lead to a large magnitude of belief revision as market participants revise their views to
be in line with the new information. Increased magnitudes of belief revisions drive the
propensity to trade and result in the observed increase in abnormal volume. Given the
complex valuation methods and reporting for changes in the fair-value of derivatives under
SFAS 133 market participants can be expected to develop different prior views about the
impending SFAS 133 compliant earnings announcements. Therefore, I anticipate increased
belief dispersion prior to SFAS 133 compliant earnings announcement. My first set of
hypotheses (in alternate form) is:

H1a: The belief dispersion prior to earnings announcements in
the post-SFAS 133 periods is larger than that in the pre-SFAS
133 periods.
H1b: The belief dispersion prior to earnings announcements in
the post-SFAS 133 periods is positively related to the magnitude
of NI and OCI attributable to SFAS 133.

The second measure of differential beliefs used in the study is the change in belief
dispersion. This measures the degree to which the announced information gives rise to
more or less divergence in beliefs. That is, when post-announcement dispersion of beliefs
is larger than pre-announcement dispersion of beliefs, then a positive change in belief
dispersion has occurred. Where pre-announcement dispersion of beliefs measures the a
priori disagreement among market participants, the change in belief dispersion measures
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the effect the new information has on the dispersion of beliefs among market participants.
A positive change in dispersion of beliefs surrounding an announcement is interpreted as
evidence that the new information has exacerbated the divergence of opinion in the market
(Bamber et al., 1997, 1999). As divergence of opinion increases, the propensity to trade
also increases since investors will seek to take equity positions consistent with the newly
determined post-announcement beliefs.
I argue that the introduction of SFAS 133 is expected to give rise to a positive
change in dispersion surrounding earnings announcements. Under the provisions of SFAS
133, changes in the fair-value of derivatives are handled as either an adjustment to capital
through Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) or are reported in current Net Income (NI).
The conditions that determine which classification is used depend on whether or not the
derivative position is a hedge and if any portion of the hedge is considered ineffective.
While the initial classification is likely to induce some level of belief heterogeneity, it is
the unpredictable changes in these classifications from period to period that I believe will
contribute significantly to heterogeneity of beliefs. The fair-value changes that affect both
measures of income not only have the potential for reversal in subsequent periods, but also
involve reclassification from OCI to NI under certain conditions. Additionally, the portion
of fair value changes deemed to be associated with the ineffective portion of the hedge is
not necessarily stable across time. In all of these cases, the OCI and NI effects are
dependent on the underlying assumptions employed by the preparer. Market participants
can be expected to evaluate the same information differentially and arrive at heterogeneous
conclusions regarding the prospects of the firm. As a result, the changes in the fair-value of
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derivatives included in NI and OCI will be sources of differential beliefs. Therefore, I
expect a positive change in belief dispersion surrounding SFAS 133 compliant earnings
announcements, and that this positive change is more pronounced than is the case for preSFAS 133 earnings announcements. My second set of hypotheses (in alternate form) is:

H2a: The change in belief dispersion surrounding earnings
announcements in the post-SFAS 133 periods is larger
(exhibiting less convergence) than that in the pre-SFAS 133
periods.
H2b: The change in belief dispersion surrounding earnings
announcements in the post-SFAS 133 periods is positively
related to the magnitude of NI and OCI attributable to SFAS
133.
The third component of differential beliefs is belief jumbling and refers to the
belief revision pattern for market participants. When the belief revision patterns (from preannouncement to post-announcement) are not parallel and belief revision paths cross (such
that the most optimistic prior to the announcement is not the most optimistic after the
announcement), jumbling has occurred. Alternatively, when participants modify their
beliefs of a firm’s prospects in a parallel fashion (meaning the rank order of the
participants’ beliefs do not change), then jumbling has not occurred. When market
participants’ beliefs change rank order relative to an informational release, then they are
differentially revising their opinions. Belief jumbling may occur when an announcement
fails to remove informational disadvantages, or conveys private information to a subset of
market participants who possess advantages in processing information (Bamber et al.,
1997). Where participants in the market may have differential skills in interpreting newly
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released information, jumbling is likely to be observed. This reflects the effect of different
interpretations of commonly received information as described by Barron (1995).
Given the complexity of the standard, the sensitivity of financial results to
underlying assumptions and the volatility of NI and OCI results, I expect that some
participants are more expert in discerning which derivative information is relevant and in
drawing conclusions from that information. As a result, belief jumbling surrounding
earnings announcements should be more pronounced in the post-SFAS 133 periods than in
the pre-SFAS 133 announcement periods. My third set of hypotheses (in alternate form) is:

H3a: The degree of belief jumbling surrounding earnings
announcements in the post-SFAS 133 periods is larger than that
in the pre-SFAS 133 periods.
H3b: The degree of belief jumbling surrounding earnings
announcements in the post-SFAS 133 periods is positively
related to the magnitude of NI and OCI attributable to SFAS
133.

Bamber et al. (1997; 1999) have shown that all the three measures of disagreement
are incrementally valuable in explaining abnormal trading volume. Further, trading volume
around earnings announcements is increasing in all three of these measures (Bamber et al.,
1997). Consistent with prior research, each of the three belief dispersion measures is
expected to provide incremental explanatory power for observed abnormal volume. The
first three hypotheses tested for a relationship between SFAS 133 income effects and each
measure of belief heterogeneity. Hypothesis four is designed to directly test the underlying
assertion of this paper; that post-SFAS 133 earnings announcements result in increased
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heterogeneity of beliefs and that this heterogeneity manifests as abnormal trading volume.
As discussed in greater detail in the Methodology section, I separate the portion of
belief heterogeneity explained by the SFAS 133 income effects and the portion of belief
heterogeneity attributable to other factors. The parsed heterogeneity metrics (the portion
related to SFAS 133, and the portion related to all other factors) are then used as
independent variables in a model designed to explain abnormal volume. Consistent with
prior hypotheses, I expect SFAS 133 income effects to induce incremental belief
heterogeneity, and this additional heterogeneity, in turn, has explanatory power for
abnormal volume. My last three hypotheses are formally stated (in alternate form):

H1c: Belief dispersion attributable to SFAS 133 is positively
associated with abnormal trading volume around earnings
announcements in the post SFAS 133 period.
H2c: Change in belief dispersion attributable to SFAS 133 is
positively associated with abnormal trading volume around
earnings announcements in the post SFAS 133 period.
H3c: Jumbling attributable to SFAS 133 is positively associated
with abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements
in the post SFAS 133 period.
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IV Methodology
Data Sources and Sample Selection
The sample consists of banks and bank holding companies for which SFAS 133
applies. To be included in the sample, the bank or bank holding company must (1) use
derivatives for non-trading purposes, (2) be publicly traded, (3) have 10K reports on
LexisNexis, (4) have annual observations in the Bank Regulatory database for two years
before and two years after the adoption of SFAS 133, (5) have analysts’ forecasts available
from I/B/E/S, and (6) have data reported in the Compustat and Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) databases. Since SFAS 133 was adopted at the firm’s discretion
between 1998 and 2001, I included data for all firms from 1996 to 2003. The data set,
therefore, includes two years of data before any firm adopted SFAS 133, and two years
after all firms had adopted SFAS 133.13 Stock price, equity return, and trading volume data
were obtained from CRSP. The effect of derivative reporting under SFAS133 was
collected manually from firm 10Ks reported through the SEC and FRY-9 reports from the
Bank Regulatory database. Analyst forecast information is taken from First Call and
I/B/E/S. Based on the preceding selection criteria, and data availability, a sample of 51
firms representing 223 firm-years is used. Of the surviving 51 firms, all adopted SFAS 133
for the 2001 fiscal year. Therefore, the sample does not include any early adopters.

13

The data, therefore, fully accounts for the entire period over which SFAS 133 was adopted.
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Measures
Heterogeneity of Beliefs
According to Bamber (1997), the heterogeneity of investor’s beliefs has three
aspects. I compute the disagreement measures in accordance with Bamber (1997) using
analysts’ forecasts and changes in those forecasts. First, dispersion in prior beliefs (DISP)
refers to the a priori disagreement among market participants prior to the release of new
information. It is measured as the pre-announcement standard deviation of analysts’
forecasts of annual earnings divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast14. For
consistency with Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991) and Barron (1995), only analysts’
forecasts issued within 45 days of the announcement are included. Due to normality issues
and for consistency with Bamber et al. (1997), I use the log-transformed measure (LDISP).
The change in forecast dispersion reflects the extent to which beliefs are, on
average, diverging (converging) around earnings announcements (Bamber et al., 1997).
This metric is computed by first computing the post-announcement standard deviation of
analysts’ forecasts based on all forecasts generated within 30 days following an
announcement. From this I subtract the pre-announcement standard deviation computed on
all analysts forecasts issued within 45 days before the announcement. The change in
standard deviation is then divided by the absolute value of the mean pre-announcement
forecast and is denoted as ∆DISP.

14

The absolute value of analyst mean forecast is used to avoid the computation of a negative dispersion, and
directly follows Bamber et al.,(1999)
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Belief jumbling occurs when individual investor’s expectations change relative to
that of other investors. Following Barron (1995), I measure jumbling around an
announcement as the complement of the correlation (Spearman) between the relative
position of individual analyst’s pre-announcement forecasts and post-announcement
forecasts. The pre-announcement forecasts are those that were issued within 45 days of the
announcement and the post-announcement forecasts are those issued within 30 days
following the announcement. I order the forecasts from lowest to highest, compute the
Spearman correlation (ρ), and then subtract the estimate of ρ from 1 to obtain the measure
of jumbling. Consistent with Bamber et al., (1997), the lognormal transformation of the
resulting measure is used in the analysis.15
Fair-Value Measures
Aspects of the earnings announcement that are suspected of driving the reevaluation of firm prospects are the Net Income and Other Comprehensive Income effects
of derivative fair valuation. The two major income components of interest are Net Income
before Extra Ordinary Items (NI) and Other Comprehensive Income (OCI). For this study,
both income measures are separated into the SFAS 133 component, and the non-SFAS 133
component. I decompose NI into the SFAS 133 portion (DNI) and the non-SFAS 133
portion (NDNI). Similarly, I decompose OCI into a SFAS 133 portion (DOCI) and the
non-SFAS 133 portion (NDOCI). The sum of DNI and DOCI, then, represents the total

15

Bamber et al., (1997) use ln(1.1 - ρ) to avoid taking the log of zero when ρ=1.
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income effect of SFAS 133. All of the income effect variables, DNI, DOCI, NDNI, and
NDOCI, are scaled on number of shares outstanding.
Abnormal Volume
To evaluate the volume effect I establish three alternative measures grounded in
prior literature. I initially employ a 3-day event window (-1 to +1) to examine the
abnormal volume surrounding earnings announcements. Additionally, I repeat the analysis
with a 7-day event window (-1 to +5) since prior research has shown that abnormally high
trading volume persists for at least 5 days following the event (Morse, 1980). All three
measures require the estimate of normal trading volume which is based on a nonannouncement period beginning the 50th trading day prior to the announcement date and
ending the 10th day prior to the announcement date. Exclusion of the 10 trading days
before the announcement is consistent with Bamber and Cheon (1995).16 The same nonannouncement period is used for both the 3-day and 7-day abnormal volume metrics.
For the first and second measures of abnormal volume, I estimate the normal
liquidity trading volume for the firms, and then predict the normal volume during the
announcement period. The difference between the estimated normal volume and the actual
trade volume is taken as the abnormal volume during the announcement period.
The first measure of abnormal volume is based on a cross-sectional, two-way fixed
effect estimation. Following Bamber et al. (1997), I include of controls for market-wide

16

Bamber and Cheon (1995) computed normal liquidity volume for a firm by excluding the trading volume
for the 21 days surrounding an earnings announcement. They exclude observations 10 days prior and 10 days
subsequent to earnings announcement.

32

trading (MKTVOL) and firm size (MVE). Also consistent with Bamber et al. (1997), I use
the natural log of both control variables. Utama and Cready (1997) utilize year dummy
variables to allow for different year-effects in normal trading volume over time.
Accordingly, I control for year-specific effects by including year-effects (YE) in the
model. Finally, to allow for firm-specific effects that may be related to volume, I include
firm-effects (FE) estimation in my model.
Using the non-announcement period defined earlier (beginning 50 trading day prior
to the announcement date and ending the 10 days prior to the announcement date), I
estimate equation 2 for the non-announcement period. Using the estimated coefficients
∧

from equation 2, I predict the daily trading volume for firm i (V id ) during the 3-day (7day) announcement period. The sum of the predicted daily volume through the
announcement period is the estimated volume for the announcement period (EVit). The
sum of the actual daily volume (V id ) through the announcement period is the actual
announcement period trade volume (Vit). Abnormal trading volume for firm i during
announcement period t (AV_FEit) is the difference between the actual volume (Vit) over
the announcement window and the predicted volume (EVit) over the announcement
window. The subscript i represents the firm and the subscript t represents the
announcement period. Since the study examines a total of six annual earnings
announcements for each firm, the subscript t will take on a value of one to seven for each
firm. Equation 2 is estimated using a cross-sectional panel data set.
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Where;
Vid =daily trading volume as a percentage of shares outstanding for
firm i on day d
LN_MKTVOLd=daily market trading volume as a percentage of
shares outstanding in the market on day d
LN_MVEit=market value of equity for firm i in year t measured at
the end of the day before the annual announcement date
FEi = firm-effect estimator for firm i
YEt = year-effect estimator for year t
Vit= actual trading volume as a percentage of shares outstanding for
firm i during announcement period t
∧
V = predicted trading volume as a percentage of shares
id

outstanding for firm i during announcement period t
∧

EVit = sum of V over the 3-day and 7-day windows representing
id

the estimated trading volume as a percentage of shares outstanding
for firm i during the announcement period in year t
AV_FEit = the difference between Vit and EVit for firm i during
announcement period t

The second measure for abnormal volume closely follows Cready and Hurtt (2002).
They control for market and idiosyncratic trading volume with the use of a serially
correlated regression (time-series) which regresses the log of the percent of shares traded
for firm i on day d on the log of the percent of shares traded for firm i in day d-1 and the
log of the percent of shares traded for the market on day d. In their 2002 study, Cready and
Hurtt examine alternative measures of investor reaction surrounding earnings
announcements. They test both trading volume and equity return metrics. They conclude
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that volume measures, and in particular the one I employ here, are superior in correctly
rejecting the null hypothesis of no investor response. Consistent with their approach, I
estimate the following first order auto-regressive model separately for each firm for the
non-announcement period. I use the same non-announcement period definitions used
before:
Vid = β0i + β1iVid-1 + β2iMVid + εid

(6)

Based on the estimated model, I forecast the estimates of firm daily volume
through the announcement period (3-day and 7-day). Actual volume (Vit) is the sum of the
actual volume observed during the announcement period. Likewise, estimated normal
volume (EVit) is the sum of the predicted volume over the announcement period using
estimates from equation 6. Consistent with Cready and Hurtt (2002), abnormal volume
from the time-series model is the difference between the actual volume and the predicted
volume standardized by the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression used to
estimate EV. The representations below are for the three day announcement window.
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Where;
Vid =log of daily trading volume as a percentage of shares
outstanding for firm i during day d
MVd =log of daily market trading volume as a percentage of shares
outstanding for the market on day d
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(9)

Vit= log of actual trading volume as a percentage of shares
outstanding for firm i during announcement period t
EVit= log of estimated trading volume as a percentage of shares
outstanding for firm i during announcement period t
σit= the standard deviation of the residuals from the market
regression used to determine EVit
AV_TSit= the difference between Vit and EVit for firm i during
announcement period t

The third abnormal volume metric follows Bamber and Cheon (1995). They
compute two measures; one measuring fluctuations in the firm’s percentage of shares
traded, and the other measuring the difference between the firm’s percentage of share
traded relative to the market’s percentage of shares traded. Tkac (1999) suggests that
fluctuations in market volume can influence firm trading volume. Therefore, a single
measure of a firm’s abnormal trading volume should capture the firm’s fluctuations in
trading volume while controlling for fluctuations in trading volume market-wide. By
controlling for market-wide fluctuations the firm’s idiosyncratic abnormal trading volume
can be isolated. Accordingly, I adjust Bamber and Cheon’s (1995) firm specific measure
by subtracting from it the difference between the market-wide percentage of shares traded
during the announcement period and the market-wide percentage of share traded during the
non-announcement period.17 This difference-in-differences approach produces a measure
of firm abnormal trading volume adjusted for fluctuations in market-wide trading volume.
I compute the firm’s difference in volume as the difference between the percentage
of outstanding shares traded during the 3-day (7-day) announcement period and the
17

This is a difference-in-differences approach since I am subtracting the difference in the market-wide
percentage of shares traded (between announcement period and non-announcement period) from the
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average percentage of shares traded during the non-announcement period. The marketwide difference in volume is the difference between the percentage of outstanding shares
traded market-wide during the 3-day (7-day) announcement period and the percent of
shares traded market-wide during the non-announcement period. The difference between
the firms’ volume difference and the markets’ volume difference are the measures of
abnormal volume AV03DF (3-day) and AV07DF (7-day). Formally, AV03DF and
AV07DF are calculated as:
⎡⎛

⎞ ⎛

⎞⎤

⎡⎛ AP _ TRADEmarket,t ⎞ ⎛ NA _ TRADEmarket,t
⎟−⎜
⎟ ⎜
⎣⎢⎝ AP _ OUTmarket,t ⎠ ⎝ NA _ OUTmarket,t

( AVxxDFit ) = ⎢⎜⎜ AP _ TRADEit ⎟⎟ − ⎜⎜ NA _ TRADEit ⎟⎟⎥ − ⎢⎜⎜
⎣⎝ AP _ OUTit ⎠ ⎝ NA _ OUTit ⎠⎦

⎞⎤
⎟⎥ (1)
⎟
⎠⎦⎥

Where;
AVxxDFi,t = represents 3-day window (AV03DF) and 7-day window (AV07DF) abnormal
volume for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’.
AP_TRADEit= sum of trading volume over three (seven) day announcement period for
firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’.
AP_OUTit= sum of firm shares outstanding over three (seven) day announcement period
for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’.
NA_TRADEit= sum of trading volume for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’ over the non-announcement
period which begins fifty days prior to the announcement date and ends ten days before the
announcement date of firm ‘i’.
NA_OUTit= sum of firm shares outstanding for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’ over the nonannouncement period which begins fifty days prior to the announcement date and ends ten
days before the announcement date of firm ‘i’.
AP_TRADEmarket,t= sum of market-wide trade volume over three (seven) day
announcement period in year ‘t’.
AP_OUTmarket,t= sum of market-wide shares outstanding over three (seven) day
announcement period in year ‘t’.
NA_TRADEmarket,t= sum of market-wide trading volume in year ‘t’ over the nonannouncement period which begins 50 days prior to the announcement date and ends ten
days before the announcement date of firm ‘i’.
NA_OUTmarket,t= sum of market-wide shares outstanding in year ‘t’ over the nonannouncement period which begins 50 days prior to the announcement date and ends ten
days before the announcement date of firm ‘i’.

difference in the firm’s percentage of shares traded (between announcement period and non-announcement
period).
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Control Variables
Abnormal Returns
Many researchers (Abarbanell, 1995; Bamber & Cheon, 1995; Barron, 1995;
Cready & Hurtt, 2002; Holthausen & Verrecchia, 1990; Karpoff, 1986) have suggested
that studies designed to detect investor response should include an examination of both
return-based and trading-based metrics. As the trading volume response is in part related to
the price response, the inclusion of this control is necessary to isolate the trading volume
fluctuations attributable to other factors. Consistent with prior research, I include a control
variable for abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal returns are computed for both the
three-day (CAR03) and seven-day (CAR07) event windows.18 Following Bamber et al.,
(1999), the natural log of the absolute value of the computed abnormal return is used in the
model (LCAR03 and LCAR07).
Earnings Surprise
Abarbanell (1995) suggested that research using dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as
a proxy for investor disagreement should include a measure for earnings surprise as well as
other controls. Consistent with Bamber et al. (1997), the control variable for earnings
surprise is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the mean analysts
forecast and the actual EPS (before extra items), deflated by the absolute value of the mean

18

CRSP excess returns are only sparsely available for my sample. Therefore, I compute excess returns.
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forecast (SUR).19 Following Bamber et al., (1999), the log of this variable will be used to
control for skewness (LSUR).
Institutional Holding
Utama and Cready (1997) and Tkac (1999) examine the differential access to
information as well as differential capacity for processing that information between
institutional and non-institutional investors. These studies indicate that the observed
volume response attendant to an earnings announcement can be expected to be partially
explained by the differences in institutional holdings across firms. Therefore, I include the
percent of shares held by institutions as a control variable in my volume models (INST). I
measure institutional holdings at the close of the last trading day before the announcement
date.
Level of Derivative Activity
Ahmed et al., (2006) found value-relevance in the magnitude of the net fair-value
of recognized derivatives (post SFAS 133). However, they found no value-relevance for
the net fair-value of disclosed derivatives (pre SFAS 133). The interest in the current study
is to isolate the income effect of the new standard, and, therefore a control for the
magnitude of derivative activity is necessary. Consistent with the operationalization
employed by Ahmed et al., (2006), I use the net fair-value of recognized derivatives
(RFVD) as a control for the magnitude of derivative activity in the post SFAS 133 period
and the net fair-value of disclosed derivatives (DFVD) as a control in the pre-SFAS 133

19

I also replicate the analysis under a random-walk assumption using earnings in time t as the expectation of
earnings in time t+1.
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period. Both RFVD and DFVD are scaled on the number of shares outstanding at the close
of business the day before the earnings announcement. To allow a direct examination of
the differential effect between disclosure and recognition on the heterogeneity measures, I
include both DFVD and RFVD in the model as FVD (fair-value of derivatives) and
introduce an interaction term (POST) that takes the value of one in the post-SFAS 133
periods.
Tests for Hypotheses H1a-b, H2a-b, and H3a-b
Hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H3a are examined via univariate analysis and statistical
tests for differences in means. Hypotheses, H1b, H2b, and H3b claim a relationship
between the three measures of belief heterogeneity and income measures. These models
are estimated individually using a cross-sectional panel data set.
LDISPit = β0 + β1(DNIit) + β2(DOCIit) + β3(NDNIit) + β4(NDOCIit) + β5(FVDit) +
β6(POST*FVDit) + β7(LSURit) + β8(INSTit) + (FEi) + (YEt) + εit

(10)

∆DISPit = β0 + β1(DNIit) + β2(DOCIit) + β3(NDNIit) + β4(NDOCIit) + β5(FVDit) +
β6(POST*FVDit) + β7(LSURit) + β8(INSTit) + (FEi) + (YEt) + εit

(11)

JUMBit = β0 + β1(DNIit) + β2(DOCIit) + β3(NDNIit) + β4(NDOCIit) + β5(FVDit) +
β6(POST*FVDit) + β7(LSURit) + β8(INSTit) + (FEi) + (YEt) + εit

(12)

Where;
LDISPit = pre-announcement standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of annual earnings
divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast for firm i in year t
∆DISPit = standard deviation of earnings forecasts after earnings announcement less the
standard deviation of earnings forecasts preceding the earnings announcement. This
change in the standard deviation is divided by the absolute value of the mean preannouncement forecast for firm i in year t
JUMBit = the complement of the correlation (Spearman) between the relative position of
individual analysts’ pre and post announcement forecasts for firm i in year t
DNIit = portion of net income before extraordinary items attributable to SFAS 133, scaled
by the number of shares outstanding at the close of business the day before the earnings
announcement for firm i in year t
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DOCIit = portion of Other Comprehensive Income attributable to SFAS 133, scaled by the
number of shares outstanding at the close of business the day before the earnings
announcement for firm i in year t
NDNIit = portion of net income before extraordinary items not attributable to SFAS 133,
scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the close of business the day before the
earnings announcement for firm i in year t
NDOCIit = portion of Other Comprehensive Income not attributable to SFAS 133, scaled
by the number of shares outstanding at the close of business the day before the earnings
announcement for firm i in year t
FVDit = gross fair value of derivatives (recognized and disclosed) for firm i in year t
scaled on the market value of equity at the close of business the day before the earnings
announcement
POSTit = a binary variable taking on the value of one in the post-SFAS 133 periods,
otherwise the variable takes the value of zero.
LSURit = log of the absolute value of the difference between the mean analysts forecast
and the actual EPS (before extra items), deflated by the absolute value of the mean
forecast for firm i in year t
INSTit = percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors for firm i in year
t
FEi = firm-effect estimator for firm i
YEt = year-effect estimator for year t

Support for hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b is found when the coefficients on
DOCI and DNI are significant and positive. A significant and positive coefficient would
indicate that measures of belief heterogeneity are increasing in the magnitude of income
effects arising from SFAS 133 (DOCI and DNI).
Tests for Hypothesis H1c, H2c, and H3c
Hypotheses H1c, H2c, and H3c posit that the association between SFAS 133
reporting and abnormal volume is translated through belief revisions. That is, the new
reporting (SFAS 133) gives rise to differential beliefs which in turn gives rise to abnormal
trading volume. It is through the dispersion of beliefs that the new standard affects volume.
To test this, heterogeneity must be decomposed into the portion attributable to SFAS 133,
and the portion attributable to other factors. Accordingly, I first compute the portion of the
three measures of belief heterogeneity attributable to SFAS 133. Using the coefficients for
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DOCI and DNI from equations 10, 11, and 12, I construct variables for a second step
∧

regression with equations 13, 14, and 15 below. The metrics LDISP _ DNI , ∆DISP∧_ DNI ,
it
it
and

∧

JUMB _ DNI it each

are estimates of the portion of the belief heterogeneity that is
∧

attributable to the SFAS 133 net income effect. The metrics LDISP _ DOCI , ∆DISP _∧ DOCI ,
it
it
and

∧

JUMB _ DOCI it each

are estimates of the portion of the belief heterogeneity that is

attributable to the SFAS 133 other comprehensive income effect. Second, I compute the
portion of the belief heterogeneity measures not directly associated with SFAS 133 income
effects by subtracting the total of the SFAS 133 income effects from LDISP, ∆DISP, and
JUMB, respectively. As shown in equations 16, 17, and 18, these variables are
denoted LDISP ∧_ OTH , ∆DISP ∧_ OTH , and
it
it
∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

∆DISP _ DOCI it
∧

∧

∧

∧

∆DISP _ OTH it

(13b)

(DOCI )
it

(14a)

(DNI )
it

∧

∧

2

(14a)

(DOCI )
it

(15a)

(DNI )
it

1

∧

JUMB _ DOCI it

2

1

=β

=β

JUMB _ DNI it

LDISP _ OTH it

=β

=β

∆DISP _ DNI it

(13a)

it

1

∧

LDISP _ DOCI it

respectively.

(DNI )

=β

LDISP _ DNI it

∧

JUMB _ OTH it ,

=β
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(15b)

(DOCI )
it

∧
= LDISP − [ LDISP _

DNI it

∧
= ∆DISP − [∆DISP _

DNI it
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∧
+ LDISP _ DOCI

it

∧
+ ∆DISP _ DOCI

(16)

]

it

]

(17)

∧

JUMB _ OTH it

=

∧

JUMB − [ JUMB _ DNI it

+

(18)

∧

JUMB _ DOCI it ]

The decomposed heterogeneity measures are used in equations 19, 20, and 21. The
model is then estimated to identify the relationship between heterogeneity induced by
SFAS 133 and abnormal volume. Each of the models below is estimated separately as a
cross-sectional regression including firm and year effects.
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Where;
AVit represents abnormal volume for firm i in period t and all other measures are as
previously defined. Equations 19, 20, and 21 are estimated separately using each of the
three previously defined abnormal volume measures; AV03TS, AV03FE, and AV03DF.
The 7-day window versions of each of the three measures AV07TS, AV07FE, and
AV07DF are also estimated.

One issue that arises in estimating equations 19, 20, and 21 is that the standard
errors for the estimated belief heterogeneity measures are understated and are inappropriate
for drawing inferences. According to Pagan (1984), Oxley and McAleer (1993), and
Murphy and Topel (2002), the standard errors generated from the second step of a two step
regression with constructed regressors will understate the true standard error. One solution
is to apply post-hoc adjustments to the variance-covariance matrix to obtain correct
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standard errors. Another solution, and the one I use, is a bootstrap estimate of the standard
errors. A more detailed discussion of the understated standard errors and the bootstrap
approach is provided in the results section.
Hypotheses H1c, H2c, and H3c are supported when the coefficients β1 and β2 from
equations 19, 20 and 21 are positive and significant. In each case, a significant finding
would indicate that a portion of the abnormal trading volume in the post SFAS 133 period
is associated with the heterogeneity of beliefs induced by the income effects of SFAS 133.
Further, this would lend credence to the notion that the recognition of derivative fair-values
gives rise to abnormal trading volume by altering the belief and belief revisions of
investors.
Results indicate that the income effect (DNI and DOCI) resulting from the fairvalue recognition of hedging derivatives induces differential beliefs among investors. This
suggests that while fair-value recognition of hedging derivatives has value relevance
(Ahmed et al., 2006), the income effect of such reporting induces a reduction in the
consensus of beliefs in the market. That is, a trade-off exists between the value relevance
of the fair-value recognition of hedging derivatives under SFAS 133 and the degree of
consensus surrounding earnings under the standard.
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IV Results
Sample Size Determination

The sample of banks required for the analysis was identified from the Bank
Regulatory Database which is based on regulatory filings (Call Reports, FR-Y9, etc). From
this database, a total of 439 banking organizations were identified as utilizing derivatives
for hedging purposes. Only 101 of these organizations, representing 707 firm-years, also
had 10-K filings with the SEC during the period 1996 though 2003. Since the income
effect of SFAS 133 is only available from the 10-K filings, firms not filing with the SEC
were excluded from the study.
Trading volume data for the firms in the sample were obtained from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Trading volume data were needed for the
period between 50 days prior to five days after the earnings announcement dates for each
firm for the period 1996 - 2003. A total of 208 firm-years were lost from my sample due to
an insufficient number of trading volume observations during the non-announcement
period.
Measures of belief heterogeneity were computed from analysts’ forecasts issued
within 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date and 45 days following the earnings
announcement date. The prior dispersion (LDISP) and change in dispersion (∆DISP)
heterogeneity measures rely on the standard deviation in analysts forecasts. The ∆DISP
measure requires the standard deviation in analysts’ forecasts both before and after the
announcement date. For consistency I only include the forecasts for analysts that are
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present both before and after the announcement. In computing LDISP I use only forecasts
from analysts that are retained for the ∆DISP computation. As a result, a total of 276 firmyear observations were lost. The analyses dealing with prior dispersion (LDISP) and
change in dispersion (∆DISP), therefore, are restricted to 51 firms representing 223 firmyear observations. The third heterogeneity measure is based on the non-parametric
correlation of analysts’ rank ordered earnings forecast before and after the earnings
announcement. Computation of this measure where only two analysts are present produces
a correlation of 1 or -1. Therefore, I omit firm-years with less than three analysts providing
forecasts before and after the announcement date. An additional 14 firms and 131 firm
years are lost. The remaining sample for the analyses related to jumbling (JUMB) is
restricted to 37 firms with 92 firm-years. Determination of sample just described is
summarized as Table 1.
Data Set Description and Univariate Statistics

Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the firm-year observations included in
the study. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the entire sample (N=223) in the study.
Panel B shows the summary statistics for the firm-year observations before adoption of
SFAS 133. In Panel B, derivative NI, derivative OCI, and derivative incomes are not
reported since derivative income measures were not available prior to the adoption of
SFAS 133. Panel C shows the summary statistics for the firm year observations after the
adoption of SFAS 133. Overall, the table shows the consistency of the total sample with
the pre and post SFAS 133 sub-samples.
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TABLE 1
Sample Determination

This table provides a summary of how the final sample was determined.
Number
of Firms
Firms Identified as using Derivatives on the
Bank Regulatory Database

439

Initial Sample from SEC 10-K Collection

101

Loss due to missing volume data
Loss due to insufficient analyst following
Sample used in analysis of LDISP and ∆DISP

707
(208)
(276)

51

Observations having less than 3 analysts
following
Sample used in analysis of JUMB

Number of
Firm-Years

223

(131)

37

92

Firms were originally identified as using derivatives for hedging purposes
for the period 1996 through 2003 based on reporting in the Bank Regulatory
Database (form FY-9). Of these institutions, only 101 also filed 10-K with
the SEC. These 101 firms represented 707 firm-years of data. Due to
missing information necessary for the analyses, a total of 51 firms
representing 223 firm-years are used in examinations of LDISP and ∆DISP.
Further reduction in sample size is necessary to obtain reasonable estimates
of JUMB. Therefore, a total of 37 firms, representing 92 firm-years, are used
in examinations of JUMB.

The gross fair-value of derivatives reported in Table 2 shows the sum of the
absolute value of all hedging derivative positions (asset or liability) for the firm. Panel A
shows that the gross fair-value of derivatives for the total sample ranges from $0.01
million to 28.43 million with an average of $1.15 million. Panel B shows that in the pre47

SFAS 133 period the gross fair value of hedging derivatives ranges from 0.09 to 28.43
million with an average of 1.55 million. In the post SFAS 133 period (Panel C) the gross
fair value of hedging derivatives ranges from 0.01 to 8.34 million with an average of 0.83.
This represents a slight reduction in the nominal values of gross derivative positions, and
may reflect a more careful application of derivative instruments after SFAS 133 was
introduced.
Derivative net income and derivative other comprehensive income are also reported
in Table 2. Since derivative income is only reported after the adoption of SFAS 133, the
derivative income statistics reported in Panel A are identical to those reported in Panel C.
Panel C shows that the derivative net income ranges from a loss of $2.5 million to profit of
$0.9 million with the average being a loss of $14.6 thousand. Derivative other
comprehensive income ranges from a negative equity adjustment of $472.0 thousand to a
positive equity adjustment of $930.0 thousand with an average of $10.13 thousand. Panel
C of Table 2 also reports the total of derivative incomes (net income and other
comprehensive income) as a percent of total incomes (net income and other comprehensive
income). This ratio ranges from negative 2.6 percent to positive 2.3 percent.
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables in the study. All income
measures used are shown as dollars per share. Income measures (DNI, NDNI, DOCI,
NDOCI) exhibiting extreme values are winsorized at the 99 and 1 percent levels rather
than dropped from the sample. Of the three abnormal volume measures, only the fixedeffect estimated abnormal volume (AV03FE and AV07FE) and the difference-indifferences estimated abnormal volume (AV03DF and AV07DF) can be expressed as
48

percentages. Both of these measures express abnormal volume as a percent of outstanding
shares traded. The time-series estimated volume measures (AV03TS and AV07TS) are
scalars that do not directly represent a volume level or a volume percentage. Rather, the
time-series estimates can only be used to indicate relative size of the estimated abnormal
volume. Consistent with prior literature, the positive average abnormal returns (CAR03
and CAR07) and positive average abnormal volume statistics (AV03FE, AV07FE,
AV03DF, and AV07DF) surrounding earnings announcements indicate that investors do
react to earnings announcements both in terms of equity prices and in trade activity.
The heterogeneity measures are computed consistent with Bamber et al., (1997).
The Bamber et al., (1997) study covers the 10 year period from 1984 through 1994, and is
not restricted by industry. They report mean and median values for prior dispersion of
0.127 and 0.063, respectively with a standard deviation 0.297. Table 3 shows that prior
dispersion in this study has a mean of 0.0462, a median of 0.0079, and a standard deviation
of 0.122. Change in dispersion is reported by Bamber et al., (1997) with a mean of -0.006,
a median of -0.015, and a standard deviation of 0.163. Table 3 reports a mean for change in
dispersion of -0.0009, a median of 0.0081, and a standard deviation of 0.0968. Bamber et
al., (1997) also report the Spearman correlation between the rank ordered analysts forecast
before and the rank ordered analysts for each after earnings announcement. This is the base
number used in computing JUMB. They report a mean of 0.477, a median of 0.589, and a
standard deviation of 0.415. Table 3 reports the same statistic (CORR) for this study and
shows a mean of 0.3652 a median of 0.5867, and a standard deviation of 0.6959. The
differences between the heterogeneity measures reported in Table 3 and those reported by
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Bamber et al.,(1997) is likely attributable to this study’s focus on regulated banking
organizations. Due to the U.S. regulatory environment, banking organizations receive
greater scrutiny and bear a heavier reporting burden than many other industries. As a
result, it seems reasonable to expect that the banking industry would also experience lower
divergences in investor opinion than the broader market. This is the case when comparing
prior dispersion and change in dispersion with the Bamber et al., (1997) study.
Pairwise correlations for variables in the study are included as Table 4. Correlations
over 0.25 and /or significant at the p<.001 level are discussed. Derivative other
comprehensive income (DOCI) is negatively correlated (-0.564) with non-derivative other
comprehensive income (NDOCI). This reflects the recording of cash flow hedge effects in
other comprehensive income along with changes in the hedged item being recorded in
other comprehensive income. Only the cash flow hedge portion is classified by SFAS 133
as a derivative income effect. As such, an increase in cash-flow hedge fair-value (DOCI) is
negatively related to decreases in the hedged items (NDOCI).
Heterogeneity measures prior dispersion (LDISP) and change in dispersion
(∆DISP) show a correlation of -0.444 which is significant at the p<.001 level. Since the
∆DISP is reporting the change in the post announcement period dispersion relative to the

preannouncement level of dispersion, the negative correlation indicates that the reduction
in dispersion associated with the earnings announcement increases as the preannouncement level of dispersion increases. That is, as prior dispersion increases, the
greater the convergence (∆DISP) of opinion based on the earnings announcement.

50

Correlations among all six abnormal volume measures are positive, relatively large,
and significant at the p<.001 level. This is confirmatory that the six abnormal trading
volume measures reflect the same underlying phenomenon. The same is true for the two
measures of abnormal returns, which show a positive correlation coefficient of .333 and is
significant at the p<.001 level.
Earnings surprise (LSUR) is positively correlated with prior dispersion (LDISP)
and negatively associated with change in dispersion (∆DISP). Prior uncertainty about a
forthcoming earnings report is likely to generate larger dispersion in analysts forecasts
(LDISP) and can be expected to manifest in a large error in earnings forecast (LSUR).
Additionally, a larger earnings surprise induces a decrease in the dispersion in analyst’s
revised forecasts (i.e. ∆DISP). This reflects the new information provided to the market
when the earnings surprise (LSUR) increases. A larger surprise indicates a greater degree
of newly released information. To the extent that the new information is interpreted
commonly by individuals, the dispersion in forecasts can be expected to decrease after an
earnings announcement containing the new information. This gives rise to the negative and
significant correlation between ∆DISP and LSUR.
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TABLE 2

This table reports broad financial measures for the firms included in the sample. Panel A reports the measures for all firmyears included in the sample. Panel B and Panel C report the same measures for the firm-years prior to the adoption of SFAS
133 and after the adoption of SFAS 133, respectively.
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms – Full Sample
PANEL A: Full Sample (N=223 firm-years)
Total Assets ($ thousands)
Market Value of Equity ($ millions)
FV of Derivatives - gross ($ millions)
FV of Derivatives - net ($ millions)
Net Income($ thousands)
Other Comprehensive Income ($ thousands)
Derivative NI ($ thousands)
Derivative OCI ($ thousands)
Derivative incomes / Total Incomes
FV of Derivatives (gross) / Total Assets
FV of Derivatives (net) / Total Assets

Mean
115,211.40
21,600.00
1.15
0.34
1,363.14
(6.53)
(14.64)
10.13
0.001%
0.002%
0.001%
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Median
38,564.59
9,184.66
0.74
0.08
486.30
2.76
0.00
0.00
0.003%
0.002%
-0.001%

Min
1,394.36
156.32
0.01
(0.96)
(511.00)
(3,365.00)
(2,464.00)
(472.00)
-2.689%
0.001%
-0.001%

Max
1,264,032.00
260,000.00
28.43
11.52
17,853.00
1,912.00
985.22
930.00
2.337%
0.049%
0.020%

TABLE 2 (cont)
Descriptive Statistics for Firms in Sample – Before adoption and after adoption of SFAS 133
PANEL B: Pre-SFAS 133 (N=124 firm-years)
Total Assets ($ thousands)
Market Value of Equity ($ millions)
FV of Derivatives - gross ($ millions)
FV of Derivatives - net ($ millions)
Net Income($ thousands)
Other Comprehensive Income ($ thousands)
Derivative NI ($ thousands)
Derivative OCI ($ thousands)
Derivative incomes / Total Incomes
FV of Derivatives (gross) / Total Assets
FV of Derivatives (net) / Total Assets

Mean
141,833.50
25,700.00
1.55
0.58
1,679.17
(0.23)

Median
30,859.13
9,060.28
0.40
0.05
441.73
2.05

Min
1,394.36
175.04
0.09
(0.35)
(41.42)
(3,365.00)

Max
1,264,032.00
260,000.00
28.43
11.52
17,853.00
1,698.00

0.002%
0.001%

0.000%
0.000%

0.000%
-0.003%

0.048%
0.020%

PANEL C: Post-SFAS 133 (N=99 firm-years)
Total Assets ($ thousands)
Market Value of Equity ($ millions)
FV of Derivatives - gross ($ millions)
FV of Derivatives - net ($ millions)
Net Income($ thousands)
Other Comprehensive Income ($ thousands)
Derivative NI ($ thousands)
Derivative OCI ($ thousands)
Derivative incomes / Total Incomes
FV of Derivatives (gross) / Total Assets
FV of Derivatives (net) / Total Assets

Mean
88,589.31
17,600.00
0.83
0.14
1,120.92
(11.59)
(14.64)
10.13
0.001%
0.002%
0.000%

Median
45,447.95
10,200.00
0.64
0.23
601.00
9.50
0.00
0.00
0.003%
0.001%
0.000%

Min
1,534.38
156.32
0.01
(0.96)
(511.00)
(2,810.00)
(2,464.00)
(472.00)
-2.689%
0.000%
-0.001%

Max
716,937.00
188,000.00
8.34
1.27
13,519.00
1,912.00
985.22
930.00
2.337%
0.040%
0.014%

Not Reported Prior to SFAS 133 Adoption
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for Income Measures and Abnormal Trading Volume (N=223 firm-years)
Standard
Measure
Description1
Mean
Median
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Income Measures
DNI
Derivative NI ($ per share)
0.0296
0.0000
0.1869
-0.6077
1.7344
DOCI
Derivative OCI ($ per share)
0.0471
0.0000
0.4800
-2.4797
3.7000
NDNI
Non-Derivative NI ($ per share)
2.5124
2.3660
1.3245
-4.4007
5.2600
NDOCI
Non-Derivative OCI ($ per share)
-0.0352
0.0124
0.7060
-3.4500
2.6979
Abnormal Trading Volume Measures
AV03TS
3-day – Time Series model
AV03FE
3-day – Firm Effect model
AV03DF
3-day – Difference model
AV07TS
7-day – Time Series model
AV07FE
7-day – Firm Effect model
AV07DF
7-day – Difference model

1.3582
0.255%
0.037%
2.4042
0.432%
0.015%

Note 1: See Appendix A for computation and full description of variables
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0.9357
-0.043%
-0.012%
2.3106
-0.045%
-0.019%

3.6695
1.038%
0.254%
6.7015
1.979%
0.184%

-6.4611
-0.814%
-0.427%
-11.9265
-2.002%
-0.660%

19.6792
6.535%
1.854%
32.3281
12.211%
0.999%

TABLE 3 (cont.)
Descriptive Statistics for Heterogeneity Measures and Control Variables (N=223 firm-years)
Standard
Measure
Description1
Mean
Median
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Heterogeneity Measures
DISP*
Dispersion
0.0462
0.0079
0.1222
0.0013
0.7600
LDISP
Natural log of DISP
-4.4645
-4.8368
1.3981
-6.6765
-0.2744
Change in dispersion
-0.0009
0.0081
0.0968
-0.6800
0.1970
∆DISP
CORR*
Correlation between pre- and postannouncement analyst forecast rank order
0.3652
0.5867
0.6959
-1.0000
1.0000
JUMB
Natural log of (1.1-CORR)
-0.9007
-0.6673
1.1844
-2.3026
0.7419
Control Variables
SURP*
Earnings Surprise (dollars per share)
LSUR
Natural log of Earning Surprise
INST
Institutional Holdings (% of shares out)
FVD
Fair Value of Hedge Derivatives ($ per share)
CAR03*
Cumulative 3-day abnormal return (percent)
LCAR03
Natural log of the absolute value of CAR03
CAR07*
Cumulative 7-day abnormal return (percent)
LCAR07
Natural log of the absolute value of CAR07

-0.0063
-4.3982
0.4084
1.1535
0.0030
-4.0722
0.0052
-3.7697

0.0026
-4.6995
0.4634
0.5236
0.0045
-3.9073
0.0051
-3.5407

0.1660
1.5937
0.2419
2.3644
0.0373
1.1041
0.0467
1.1501

Note 1: See Appendix A for computation and full description of variables
Note 2: * This form of the variable is not used in the analysis but is shown as a point of comparison to prior literature
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-0.9300
-8.2177
0.0000
0.0001
-0.2281
-8.3653
-0.1440
-8.6337

0.8200
-0.0726
0.9247
8.3448
0.1231
-1.4782
0.1313
-1.9377

TABLE 4
Pearson Correlations

DNI
DOCI
NDNI
NDOCI
LDISP
∆DISP
JUMB
FVD
LSUR
INST
AV03TS
AV03FE
AV03DF
AV07TS
AV07FE
AV07DF
LCAR03
LCAR07

DNI
1.000
-0.069
-0.037
0.046
-0.036
0.072
-0.072
0.186**
-0.087
0.153*
0.082
0.168*
0.181**
0.000
0.091
0.072
0.018
0.044

DOCI

NDNI

NDOCI

LDISP

∆DISP

JUMBLE

1.000
0.156*
-0.564***
0.015
0.028
0.047
0.153*
-0.028
0.152*
0.136*
0.375***
0.270***
0.083
0.376***
0.230***
0.082
0.061

1.000
-0.119
-0.067
0.076
0.065
0.400***
-0.072
0.089
0.145*
0.174**
0.186**
0.126
0.159*
0.171*
-0.122
-0.054

1.000
0.026
-0.026
0.022
-0.107
0.085
-0.041
-0.109
-0.308***
-0.203**
-0.084
-0.335***
-0.186**
-0.044
-0.099

1.000
-0.444***
0.047
0.048
0.730***
-0.292***
-0.109
-0.048
-0.020
-0.057
-0.030
0.016
0.080
0.158*

1.000
-0.105
0.024
-0.361***
0.040
0.124
0.086
0.110
0.098
0.066
0.095
0.068
-0.045

1.000
0.159
0.086
0.079
0.132
0.138
0.155
0.137
0.132
0.158
0.038
0.025

Note 1: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .05, .01, and .001 levels, respectively
Note 2: All variables are as defined in Appendix A

56

FVD

1.000
0.009
0.142*
0.144*
0.119
0.176**
0.062
0.064
0.125
-0.057
-0.024

LNSR

1.000
-0.221***
-0.008
-0.009
0.002
0.048
0.012
0.044
0.039
0.188**

TABLE 4 (cont.)
Pearson Correlations

DNI
DOCI
NDNI
NDOCI
LDISP
∆DISP
JUMB
FVD
LSUR
INST
AV03TS
AV03FE
AV03DF
AV07TS
AV07FE
AV07DF
LCAR03
LCAR07

INST

AV03TS

AV03FE

AV03DF AV07TS

AV07FE

1.000
0.156*
0.193**
0.148*
0.166*
0.184**
0.118
0.010
0.041

1.000
0.593***
0.797***
0.862***
0.423***
0.650***
0.172*
0.039

1.000
0.843***
0.472***
0.909***
0.668***
0.143*
0.179**

1.000
0.665***
0.672***
0.833***
0.180**
0.110

1.000
0.724*** 1.000
0.108*
0.145*
0.218** 0.142*

1.000
0.472***
0.761***
0.160*
0.101

Note 1: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .05, .01, and .001 levels, respectively
Note 2: All variables are as defined in Appendix A
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AV07DF LCAR03 LCAR07

1.000
0.333*** 1.000

Institutional holding (INST) is negatively associated with prior dispersion (LDISP).
Higher levels of institutional holdings are associated with lower levels of prior dispersion
in analysts’ forecasts and likely reflect the nature of firms where institutional investors
invest. These firms may be of an established nature, probably larger, and have a more
stable income stream that those firms avoided by institutional investors. A more steady
income stream would manifest as a smaller dispersion in analysts’ forecasts since the
reduced earnings variability makes the earnings prediction more straight forward.
The positive association between non-derivative net income (NDNI) and fair value
of derivatives (FVD) is most likely indicative of a size-effect. As NDNI increases the
tendency for a financial firm to employ derivatives to hedge that income also increases.
Both of the other comprehensive income measures (DOCI and NDOCI) are significantly
correlated with the fixed-effect (AV03FE, AV07FE) and difference-in-differences
(AV03DF, AV07DF) abnormal volume estimates. Abnormal volume is negatively
correlated with NDOCI, indicating that higher levels of non-derivative other
comprehensive income results in lower disaggregated beliefs in the market. Conversely,
abnormal volume moves in the same direction as DOCI, indicating that the derivative
related portion of other comprehensive income increases disaggregated beliefs. A more
complete listing of the variables employed in the analyses and the method used to compute
each is included as Appendix A.
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Preliminary Examination

Broadly, my hypotheses are designed to test for the relationship between income
effects of SFAS 133 and belief heterogeneity. While no specific hypothesis is posited for
the overall relationship between abnormal volume and SFAS 133 income measures, I
examine this overall effect. To isolate the effect of derivative income on abnormal volume,
I control for earnings surprise (LSUR), abnormal returns (LCAR03 / LCAR07), and firm
effects. The results of this preliminary examination are reported in Table 5. Panel A reports
the results of the model using 3-day window abnormal volume measures as the dependent
variable. Panel B reports the results of the same regressions with the 7-day abnormal
volume windows as the dependent variable.
In Panel A, the AV03TS model shows a model significance at p<.01 with an
R2(within) of 6.18 percent. The ‘within’ R2 is reported since I apply the within
transformation blocked on firm. Therefore, the relevant measure of explained variance is
the amount of variation within groups (firms) that is explained by the model. Derivative
net income (DNI) shows a positive coefficient of 1.9034 which is significant at the p<.10
level. The AV03TS measure is a scalar that does not directly represent a volume level or a
volume percentage. Rather it indicates relative size of the estimated abnormal volume
alone. Therefore, a one dollar per-share increase in DNI translates to a 1.9034 unit increase
in the AV03TS measure of abnormal volume. Derivative other comprehensive income
(DOCI) has a positive but non-significant coefficient. Non-derivative net income (NDNI)
is also positively associated with changes in AV03TS and significant at the p<.01 level. As
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expected, LSUR and LCAR03 both have positive coefficients. The coefficient on LCAR03
is significant at the p<.05 level
Also in Panel A, the AV03FE model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains
approximately 12 percent of the variation in the abnormal volume measure. AV03FE is a
measure of abnormal volume expressed as a percent of shares outstanding. DNI shows a
positive coefficient significant at the p<.01 level. A one dollar per share increase in DNI is
positively associated with a 1.11 percent increase in the percent of shares traded. DOCI
also shows a positive coefficient estimate, however, it is non-significant. NDNI is positive
and significant (p<.01). NDOCI is also significant (p<.01), but with a negative coefficient.
LSUR and LCAR03 both have positive coefficient estimates and are significant at the p<.1
and p<.01 levels, respectively.
Finally, Panel A also shows the results of the AV03DF model. This model is
significant at the p<.01 level and explains 9.96 percent of the variation in the abnormal
volume measure. DNI is significant at the p<.01 level and indicates that a one dollar per
share increase in DNI is associated with an increase of 0.30 percent increase in trading
volume. In this model DOCI is significant at the p<.05 level and indicates a one dollar
increase in DOCI per share is associated with at 0.09 percent increase in trading volume.
As in the previous models NDNI is also positive and significant at the p<.01 level. Both
LSUR and LCAR03 have positive coefficients, but only LCAR03 is significant (p<.01).
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TABLE 5
Relationship Between Derivative Income and 3-Day Abnormal Trading Volume

This table reports the coefficient estimates and their respective p-values for the
regression of each 3-day announcement window abnormal volume on SFAS 133 related
income measures, controlling for earnings surprise, 3-day abnormal returns, and firm
effects. Variable definitions and computations are reported in Appendix A.
AVit= β0 + β1(DNIit) + β2(DOCit) + β3(NDNIit) + β4(NDOCIit) + β5(LSURit) + β6(LCAR03it) + FEi + εit

PANEL A

Variable
Constant
DNI
DOCI
NDNI
NDOCI
LSUR
LCAR03
Firm Effects
N
Groups
Wald-sig
Wald-stat
R2(within)

Exp.
Sign
?
+
+
?
?
+
+

AV03TS
Est.
p-value
Coef.
2.7181 0.075*
1.9034 0.094*
0.5953 0.134
0.4646 0.001***
-0.2303 0.499
0.0234 0.875
0.6062 0.011**
Included

AV03FE
p-value
Est.
Coef.
0.0060 0.044**
0.0111 0.005***
0.0033 0.184
0.0013 0.027**
-0.0017 0.006***
0.0007 0.078**
0.0010 0.010**
Included

223
51
0.0000
61.95
0.0618

223
51
0.0066
17.87
0.1203

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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AV03DF
p-value
Est.
Coef.
0.0013 0.220
0.0030 0.001***
0.0009 0.037**
0.0004 0.008***
-0.0003 0.179
0.0001 0.309
0.0004 0.007***
Included
223
51
0.0000
32.22
0.0996

TABLE 5 (cont.)
Relationship between Derivative Income and 7-Day Abnormal Trading Volume

This table reports the coefficient estimates and their respective p-values for the
regression of each 7-day announcement window abnormal volume on SFAS 133 related
income measures, controlling for earnings surprise, 7-day abnormal returns, and firm
effects. Variable definitions and computations are reported in Appendix A.
AVit= β0 + β1(DNIit) + β2(DOCit) + β3(NDNIit) + β4(NDOCIit) + β5(LSURit) + β6(LCAR07it) + FEi + εit

PANEL B

Variable
Constant
DNI
DOCI
NDNI
NDOCI
LSUR
LCAR07
Firm Effects
N
Groups
Wald-sig
Wald-stat
R2(within)

Exp.
Sign
?
+
+
?
?
+
+

AV07TS
Est.
p-value
Coef.
3.5900 0.100
0.3228 0.842
0.4750 0.588
0.6808 0.029**
-0.4314 0.496
0.1946 0.467
0.5627 0.156
Included
223
51
0.0007
23.40
0.0361

AV07FE
p-value
Est.
Coef.
0.0111 0.003
0.0129 0.019**
0.0042 0.380
0.0025 0.016**
-0.0031 0.009***
0.0011 0.059*
0.0025 0.000***
Included

AV07DF
p-value
Est.
Coef.
0.0005 0.397
0.0010 0.026**
0.0005 0.221
0.0003 0.018**
-0.0002 0.200
0.0001 0.212
0.0002 0.038**
Included

223
51
0.0000
39.39
0.1273

223
51
0.0013
21.90
0.0581

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Prior literature shows that the full effect of abnormal trading volume extends up to
5 days following earnings announcements (Morse, 1980). Therefore, in addition to the 3day window, I also test the derivative income effect against similarly computed 7-day
abnormal volume measures. Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of these models. The
model using AV07TS as the dependent variable is significant at the p<.01 level and
explains 3.61 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. The two variables of
interest both show positive coefficient estimates, however, neither is significant. The
model for the 7-day window of the fixed effect abnormal volume estimate (AV07FE) is
significant at the p<.01 level and explains 12.73 percent of the variation in the dependent
variable. DNI has a positive estimate coefficient of 0.0129 and is significant at the p<.05
level. A one dollar change in per share DNI is associated with an increase in abnormal
trading volume equal to 1.29 percent of shares outstanding. The estimated coefficient for
DOCI is also positive, but non-significant. The third model in Panel B reports the
regression results for the 7-day difference in differences abnormal volume estimate
(AV07DF). This model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 5.81 percent of the
variation in the AV07DF measure of abnormal trading volume. DNI has a significant
(p<.05) coefficient of 0.10 percent. A one dollar increase in per share DNI is positively
associated with a 0.10 percent increase in trading volume. DOCI also has a positive
estimated coefficient, but is non-significant.
The results in Table 5 support my overall hypothesis that SFAS 133 income effects
have a positive and significant associate with abnormal volume. SFAS 133 related net
income is significant in all but one of the six models. Other comprehensive income arising
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from SFAS 133 has a positive estimated coefficient in all models, but is significant only in
the AV03DF model. Net income arising from SFAS 133 is positively related to
heterogeneous beliefs measured by abnormal volume.
Results for Hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3a

The first set of hypotheses (H1a, H2a, and H3a) call for the univariate test of
differences between the pre-adoption and post-adoption levels of prior dispersion (LDISP),
change in dispersion (∆DISP), and jumbling (JUMB), respectively. I employ both the
difference in means t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney median difference tests.
Results for these tests on LDISP, ∆DISP, and JUMB are shown in Panel A of Table 6. The
test of means for LDISP shows a significant (p<.01) difference between pre-adoption and
post-adoption, however, in the reverse direction of my hypothesis. This indicates that prior
dispersion had decreased in the period following the adoption of SFAS-133. The test of
medians confirms the decline in LDISP and is significant at the p<.1 level20. The results
are contrary to hypothesis H1a, and indicate that the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is
smaller in the post-SFAS 133 adoption period than before. Several factors may be masking
the univariate difference hypothesized. For example, the adoption of Regulation FD in
2000 may have made the informational landscape significantly more homogeneous,
decreasing the information asymmetries that can give rise to dispersion in earnings
forecasts.

20

All formally stated hypotheses in this study are directional. While this permits usage of single-tailed tests,
to be conservative, all tables throughout the study report significance levels for a two-tailed test.
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TABLE 6
Pre- and Post-Adoption Differences in Belief Heterogeneity
Hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3a

This table reports the difference in mean and difference in median
tests applied to the three measures of heterogeneity. Panel A shows
the results using the pre-adoption years of 1996-2000 and the postadoption years of 2001-2003. Panel B shows the results using the
pre-adoption years of 1999-2000 and the post adoption years of
2002-2003.
PANEL A: Pre=1996-2000; Post=2001-2003

LDISP

∆DISP

JUMB

N
Mean
Median
N
Mean
Median
N
Mean
Median

Pre-133
124
-4.202
-4.643
124
-0.005
0.006
45
-0.642
-0.476

Post-133
99
-4.736
-4.895
99
0.001
0.012
47
-0.566
-0.357

Diff.

p-value

-0.534 0.004***
-0.252 0.068*
0.006 0.657
0.006 0.094*
0.076 0.695
0.119 0.404

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

PANEL B: Pre=1999-2000; Post=2002-2003

LDISP

∆DISP

JUMB

N
Mean
Median
N
Mean
Median
N
Mean
Median

Pre-133
57
-4.399
-4.811
57
-0.016
0.007
23
-0.629
-0.435

Post-133
64
-4.931
-5.073
64
0.013
0.013
31
-0.599
-0.357

Diff..

p-value

-0.532
-0.262

0.024**
0.415

0.029
0.006

0.089*
0.083*

0.03
0.078

0.906
0.752

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Also in Panel A of Table 6, I test for a difference in means of ∆DISP. While the
computed means for ∆DISP is larger in the post period, the change is non-significant.
Results for the median test also show an increase in ∆DISP following SFAS-133 adoption.
This result is significant at the p<.1 level. This result supports hypothesis H2a, and
indicates that the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts expanded in response to earnings
announcements in the post SFAS 133 adoption period.
While Jumbling shows a positive difference for both mean and median in the
period following SFAS-133 adoption, neither result is significant. As with LDISP, this
may reflect other factors inducing jumbling before the SFAS 133 adoption.
In addition to examining the differences across the entire time horizon, I conduct
the same differences in mean and differences in median tests between the two years
preceding SFAS 133 adoption and two years following adoption. The year of adoption is
excluded. By testing only the two years preceding (1999-2000) and the two years after
(2002-2003) adoption, I attempt to minimize other factors that may be masking the
hypothesized difference. Since all firms in the sample transitioned in 2001, I also drop the
transition year to isolate the effects of adopting a new standard. These results are shown in
Panel B of Table 3. Prior dispersion (LDISP) shows a significant difference between the
two periods, however, the result is counter to my hypothesis. The median test for LDISP is
non-significant. Both the mean and median tests for ∆DISP are positive and significant,
providing support for hypothesis H2a. As before, both tests for JUMB, while providing a
result consistent with my hypothesis, are not significant. Overall, I find support only for
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hypothesis H2a. The change in dispersion surrounding earnings announcements after the
adoption of SFAS 133 shows an increase in heterogeneity as measured by ∆DISP.
Supplemental analysis:
As a final step in examining the expectation of expanded belief heterogeneity after
SFAS 133 adoption, I test for differences between the pre-adoption and post-adoption
abnormal volume measures with both the mean and median tests. Table 7 reports the
results for the mean and median tests over the entire study period (1996-2003). Table 8
reports the results for the mean and median tests including only the two years prior (1999
& 2000) and the two years after the adoption year (2002 & 2003). Both the mean and
median difference tests across all abnormal volume measures show positive and significant
differences. While I have no specific hypothesis for the univariate analysis of abnormal
volume, the results are consistent with the underlying expectation of larger heterogeneity
subsequent tot the adoption of SFAS 133. Abnormal volume appears to be reflecting some
aspect of belief heterogeneity not captured by the three measure proposed by Bamber et al.,
(1999). As the LDISP, ∆DISP, and JUMB measures are computed from analysts forecasts,
the stronger relationship found in abnormal volume may be attributed to that measure
capturing aspects of heterogeneity general to the market but not shared by analysts.

67

Table 7
Pre- and Post-133 Differences in Abnormal Volume
(full sample)
Pre=1996-2000; Post=2001-2003

This table reports the difference in mean and difference in median tests
applied to the three measures of abnormal volume over the entire sample
period. Panel A shows the results for the 3-day announcement window.
Panel B shows the results for the 7-day announcement window. Pre-133
includes the years 1996-2000 and Post-133 includes the years 20012003.
PANEL A: 3-Day Window

AV03TS
AV03FE
AV03DF

Pre-133 Post-133 Difference p-value
N
124
99
Mean
0.386
2.666
2.28 0.000***
Median
0.319
2.303
1.985 0.000***
Mean
0.03%
0.44%
0.41% 0.003***
Median -0.16%
0.06%
0.22% 0.013***
Mean
-0.02%
0.10%
0.12% 0.001***
Median -0.04%
0.03%
0.06% 0.000***

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

PANEL B: 7-Day Window

AV07TS
AV07FE
AV07DF

Pre-133 Post-133 Difference p-value
N
124
99
Mean
0.661
4.558
3.897 0.000***
Median
0.489
3.467
2.979 0.001***
Mean
0.04%
0.65%
0.61% 0.013***
Median -0.29%
0.10%
0.39% 0.013***
Mean
-0.02%
0.05%
0.07% 0.002***
Median -0.04%
0.02%
0.06% 0.000***

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 8
Pre- and Post-133 Differences in Abnormal Volume
(restricted sample)
Pre=1999-2000; Post=2002-2003

This table reports the difference in mean and difference in median tests
applied to the three measures of abnormal volume for the two years
immediately preceding adoption and the two years following the adoption
year. Panel A shows the results for the 3-day announcement window.
Panel B shows the results for the 7-day announcement window. Pre-133
includes the years 1999-2000 and Post-133 includes the years 2002-2003.
PANEL A: 3-Day Window

AV03TS
AV03FE
AV03DF

Pre-133 Post-133 Difference p-value
N
57
64
Mean
0.545
3.041
2.495 0.000***
Median
0.635
2.78
2.145 0.036**
Mean
0.12%
0.64%
0.52% 0.008***
Median -0.04%
0.10%
0.13% 0.520
Mean
-0.04%
0.13%
0.16% 0.001***
Median -0.03%
0.01%
0.04% 0.083*

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

PANEL B: 7-Day Window

AV07TS
AV07FE
AV07DF

Pre-133 Post-133 Difference p-value
N
57
64
Mean
0.916
5.348
4.432 0.000***
Median
1.509
3.7
2.191 0.083*
Mean
0.27%
0.99%
0.72% 0.044**
Median -0.06%
0.25%
0.32% 0.055*
Mean
-0.04%
0.06%
0.10% 0.004***
Median -0.04%
0.01%
0.05% 0.022**

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Results for Hypothesis H1b, H2b, H3b

The second set of hypotheses (H1b, H2b, H3b) address the expected association
between the SFAS 133 income effect (DNI and DOCI) and the three measures of belief
heterogeneity (LDISP, ∆DISP, JUMB). The results for these tests are found in Table 9.
The model relating LDISP to DNI and DOCI is significant at the p<.01 level and explains
45.52 percent of the variation in LDISP within firms. Consistent with my hypothesis, the
estimated coefficient for DNI is positive and significant at the p<.10 level. A one dollar per
share increase in DNI is positively associated with a 46.22 percent change in the dispersion
of analysts’ forecasts prior to earnings announcement.21 The estimated coefficient on
DOCI is also positive, however, it is not significant at conventional levels. The other
income measures (NDNI and NDOCI) show negative coefficients, but are non-significant.
LSUR is significant (p<.01) and reports an estimated coefficient of 0.5725. Therefore, a
one percent change in the earnings surprise is associated with a 57.25 percent increase in
prior dispersion. Consistent with prior literature and my expectation, INST reports a
negative and significant (p<.10) coefficient of -0.8056. Since the variable INST is the
percent of shares outstanding held by institutions an increase of one percent in INST is
associated with an 80.56 percent decrease in prior dispersion.
Hypothesis H2b posits that there is a positive relationship between derivative
income measures and the change in dispersion (∆DSIP). Change in dispersion is the

21

For sufficiently small changes in DNI the interpretation shown here is generally acceptable. However,
since LDISP is of lognormal form and DNI is reported in levels, the exact inference is computed as 100*[exp
(.4622) – 1] = 58.76 percent. So, a one dollar change in per share DNI actually results in a 58.76 percent
change in LDISP.
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dispersion in the post-announcement period less dispersion in the pre-announcement
period, standardized by the pre-announcement period mean forecast. Table 9 shows this
model is significant at p<.05 and explains 11.53 percent of the variation in ∆DISP within
firms. The coefficient on DNI is 0.0504 and is significant at the p<.05 level. Therefore, a
one dollar per share increase in DNI is associated with a 0.0504 increase in dispersion.
That is, increasing levels of DNI gives rise to expanding dispersion in analysts’ forecasts.
DOCI has a positive estimated coefficient, however, it is non-significant. LSUR has an
estimated coefficient of -0.0171 and is significant at the p<.05 level.
Hypothesis H3b posits that the correlation of the rank ordering of analysts’
forecasts before and after the announcement will be smaller as derivative income increases.
JUMB is computed as the log of 1.1 minus the non-parametric correlation of the rank order
of analysts’ forecasts before the announcement and after the announcement. Since the
correlation of the rank order can be described as forecast order consistency, JUMB can be
described as the log of the rank order inconsistency or the log of analysts’ reordering. As
reported in Table 9, the model for JUMB is significant at the p<.01 level and explains
35.16 percent of the variation in the dependent variable within firms. The estimated
coefficient for DNI is positively associated with JUMB and is significant at the p<.05
level. For sufficiently small changes in the independent variables, the interpretation of a
coefficient is that 100 times the coefficient is equal to the percentage change in the
reordering of analysts’ forecasts. A coefficient of 2.4778 means that one cent increase in
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TABLE 9
Relationship between Heterogeneity Measures and Derivative Income
Hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b

This table reports the coefficient estimates and their respective p-values for the
regression of each heterogeneity measure on the SFAS 133 income measures,
controlling for earnings surprise, level of institutional holding, fair-value of hedging
derivatives, year effects, and firm effects.
LDISPit=β0+β1(DNIit)+β2(DOCIit)+β3(NDNIit)+β4(NDOCIit)+β5(LSURit)+ β6(INSTit)+β7(FVDit )+
β8(POST*FVDit)+ FEi + εit
∆DISPit=β0+β1(DNIit)+β2(DOCit)+β3(NDNIit)+β4(NDOCIit)+β5(LSURit)+ β6(INSTit)+β7(FVDit )+
β8(POST*FVDit)+ FEi + εit
JUMBit=β0+β1(DNIit)+β2(DOCit)+β3(NDNIit)+β4(NDOCIit)+β5(LSURit)+ β6(INSTit)+β7(FVDit )+
β8(POST*FVDit)+ FEi + εit

Variable

Exp.
Sign
Constant
?
DNI
+
DOCI
+
NDNI
?
NDOCI
?
LSUR
+
INST
FVD
+
FVD*POST
+
Year & Firm Effects
N
Groups
Wald-sig
Wald-stat
R2(within)

∆DISP
p-value
Est.
Coef.
-0.0661 0.270
0.0504 0.014**
0.0029 0.813
0.0022 0.792
-0.0042 0.728
-0.0171 0.016**
0.0593 0.352
0.0004 0.910
-0.0049 0.437
Included

LDISP
Est.
p-value
Coef.
-1.1237 0.004***
0.4622 0.097*
0.1819 0.246
-0.0529 0.425
-0.0112 0.909
0.5725 0.000***
-0.8056 0.090*
0.0486 0.281
0.0033 0.969
Included
223
51
0.0000
224.38
0.4552

223
51
0.0306
26.78
0.1153

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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JUMB
p-value
Est.
Coef.
0.1626 0.767
2.4778 0.017**
0.0223 0.962
0.0111 0.930
0.6608 0.005***
-0.0435 0.578
-0.6984 0.314
0.6740 0.010***
0.1781 0.166
Included
92
37
0.0000
20.87
0.3516

per share DNI is associated with a 2.48 percent increase in the reordering of analysts’
forecasts.22 The coefficient of DOCI is positive as hypothesized, but is non-significant.
The coefficient of NDOCI is significant at the p<.01 level and indicates that a one dollar
per share increase in NDOCI results in a 66.08 percent increase in the degree of reordering
among analysts. Finally, in this model the coefficient of FVD is also positive and
significant at the p<.01 level. This indicates that a one percent increase in the fair-value of
derivatives per share is associated with a 67.40 percent increase in the degree of analysts
reordering.
The relationship between DNI and the three measures of heterogeneity is
consistently positive and significant in all three models. DOCI has a positive coefficient in
all models, but the relationship with the three dispersion measures in not significant at
conventional levels. Hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b are supported only for the net income
effect of SFAS 133. The interpretation for hypothesis H1b is that as the per share
derivative net income increases, the degree of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts before the
earnings announcement increases. This is consistent with analysts having greater difficulty
predicting the net income associated with the SFAS 133 standard. Support for hypothesis
H2b means that an increase in per share derivative net income is associated with an
increase in analysts’ forecast dispersion from pre-announcement to post-announcement
period. This indicates that the SFAS 133 earnings information is generating heterogeneity

22

The coefficient of 2.4778 is the estimated association between a lognormal dependent variable and a
dependent variable measured in levels. For sufficiently small changes in the independent variable, the
interpretation provided is generally accepted. However, the exact inference is computed as 100*[exp
(.024778) – 1] = 2.51. A one cent change in per share DNI actually results in a 2.51 percent change in JUMB.
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in analysts’ beliefs as opposed to increasing homogeneity in beliefs. Finally, as SFAS 133
related net income per share increases, the degree of reordering among analysts (JUMB)
also increases. This is consistent with information being differentially interpreted by
analysts.
Supplemental analysis:
Additionally, I carry out several other specification tests. First, I examine the
relationships above with alternative specifications for the SFAS 133 income effects. I test
derivative income expressed as a percent of total income and derivative income expressed
as the aggregate sum of DNI and DOCI.23 Both of the alternative derivative income
specifications are positive and significant at the p<.01 level for the model with LDISP as
the dependent variable. The alternative derivative income measures are positive but
insignificant for the models with ∆DISP and JUMB as the dependent variable.
I also test for interactions among the derivative income measures (DNI and DOCI)
and control variables (LSUR, INST, FVD, and FVD*POST). None of the interaction
effects are significant at conventional levels. Finally, I test for non-linear effects of the
derivative income measures (DNI and DOCI). None were significant.
I replicate the analysis with alternative computations for LDISP and ∆DISP. I use
the analysts’ forecast standard deviation and mean provided by I/B/E/S to recompute
LDISP and ∆DISP. That is, I relax the restriction that only those analysts with forecasts
both before and after the earnings announcement be used in computing these two measures

23

Derivative Percent = (DNI+DOCI) / (DNI+DOCI+NDNI+NDOCI) ; Derivative Total = (DNI+DOCI)
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of heterogeneity. The results obtained from the alternative LDISP and ∆DISP measures are
consistent with the results reported here.
Results for Hypotheses H1c, H2c, and H3c

Hypothesis H1c, H2c, and H3c state that the portion of each of the three dispersion
measures predicted by DNI and DOCI is positively related to abnormal trading volume.
That is, I expect that the income effects of SFAS 133 influences abnormal volume through
the three heterogeneity measures. The method applied requires that the portion the
heterogeneity measures (LDISP, ∆DISP, JUMB) predicted by DNI and DOCI be used as
regressors in a second model with abnormal volume as the dependent variable. I discuss
the results of each of the three hypotheses individually, first by discussing the coefficient
estimates and p-values associated with the normally obtained standard errors. After
discussing each of these hypotheses in the context of the traditional estimation method, I
then re-evaluate the significance of the estimated coefficients in light of p-values generated
from standard errors obtained through a bootstrap procedure. Unlike the normally obtained
standard errors, the bootstrap procedure accounts for the variability transferred from the
first model to the second, providing a standard error appropriate for hypothesis testing.
Hypothesis H1c deals with the relationship between abnormal trading volume and
the portion of LDISP predicted by DNI and DOCI. Table 10 shows the results of this
examination. This model is significant at the p<.001 level and explains 17.70 percent of the
variation in AV03TS. Consistent with my hypothesis, the portions of LDISP predicted by
DNI (LDISP_DNI) and DOCI (LDISP_DOCI) both have positive estimated coefficients.
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Only the portion predicted by DOCI is significant (p<.01). This means that a one percent
change in the percent of dispersion predicted by DNI is associated with a 3.088 unit
change in the AV03TS abnormal volume measure. The portion of LDISP not explained by
derivative income measures (LDISP_OTH) shows a significant (p<.05) and negative
coefficient of -0.3749. A unit change in the portion of dispersion not predicted by
derivative income is associated with a 0.3749 unit decrease in AV03TS. Consistent with
prior literature cumulative abnormal return (LCAR03) is significant (p<.01) with an
estimated coefficient of 0.7285.
Since the LDISP_DNI and LDISP_DOCI are generated regressors, the standard
errors estimated in the regression do not take into account the fact that these regressors are
estimates rather than measures. Estimation with a bootstrap approach is also performed to
obtain standard errors appropriate for hypothesis testing. The estimated coefficients are not
affected by this approach, but the standard errors are generally larger. The associated pvalues are listed adjacent to the standard p-values under the AV03TS model. Under the
bootstrap method, only LDISP_OTH and LCAR03 retain significance in the model.
Panel A of Table 10 also reports the results of the model testing the relationship
between the abnormal trading volume measure AV03FE and the portion of LDISP
predicted by DNI and DOCI. This model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains
21.80 percent of the variation in the abnormal volume measure. Consistent with my
hypothesis, the portions of LDISP predicted by DNI (LDISP_DNI) and DOCI
(LDISP_DOCI) both have positive estimated coefficients. Only the portion of LDISP
predicted by DNI is significant (p<.10) in explaining variation in AV03FE. A one percent
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change in the LDISP explained by DNI is positively related to a 1.46 percent change in
abnormal volume. Control variables LSUR and LCAR03 are also significant and positive.
As before, the significance indicated for the variables of interest in the initial regression is
lost when the standard errors are estimated via bootstrap.
Finally, Panel A of Table 10 reports the results of the model testing the relationship
between the abnormal trading volume measure AV03DF and the portion of LDISP
predicted by DNI and DOCI. This model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains
17.23 percent of the variation in the abnormal volume measure. Both LDISP_DNI and
LDISP_DOCI have positive estimated coefficients. The coefficient on LDISP_DNI is
estimated at 0.36 percent and is significant at the p<.10 two tailed level of significance. A
one percent change in dispersion explained by DNI is associated with at 0.36 percent
increase in AV03DF. The coefficient on LDISP_DOCI is estimated at 0.53 percent and is
significant at the p<.05 two tailed level of significance. A one percent change in dispersion
explained by DOCI is associated with at 0.53 percent increase in AV03DF. The estimated
coefficient on LCAR03 is also significant (p<.01) and positive. In this model the
significance on LDISP_DOCI retains significance at the p<.1 level even after estimating
via the bootstrap method. It is important to note that the LDISP_DOCI variable is
estimated from a regression (Eq.10, Table 9) in which DOCI was not significant at
conventional levels in explaining variations in LDISP. Nonetheless, the coefficient
estimated on DOCI in equation 10 was able to transfer a sufficient amount of information
to the current model that it is significant in explaining variation in AV03DF.
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The tests on the relationship between abnormal trading volume and the portion of
LDISP predicted by derivative income are also tested in the 7-day event window. These
results are shown in Panel B of Table 10. These models are all significant at the p<.001
level and explain between 10.30 percent and 16.86 percent of the variability in the
abnormal volume measures. The variables of interest are all non-significant in these
models.
Under the normally obtained standard errors and related p-values partial support is
found for hypothesis H1c in all of the 3-day abnormal volume models. However, under the
bootstrap procedure, support is only found for hypothesis H1c in the portion of LDISP
predicted by DOCI in the AV03DF model. This indicates that while LDISP_DOCI and
LDISP_DNI do transfer some information into the secondary model (equation 19), the
precision of that information is limited. Of the three measures of abnormal volume, the
difference-in-differences (AV03DF) measure is able to detect the information transferred
in. The lack of significance in the model likely reflects that, while information was
successfully transferred into the second model, it lacked sufficient precision to be detected
in all but the AV03DF model. Application of a more precise mechanism for transferring
the information from the primary model to the secondary model might yield significant
results for the other measures of abnormal volume. The lack of any significance in the 7day window models indicates that any effect of the announcement with regard to SFAS
133 is fully reflected in the 3-day window.
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TABLE 10
Panel A: Relationship Between Predicted Dispersion and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H1c)
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal
volume measures on the levels of dispersion predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (LDISP_DNI and LDISP_DOCI).
The results reported here are for the 3-day announcement window statistics. The table also reports the p-values associated
with the bootstrap method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings
surprise, institutional holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects.

^

^

^

AVit=β0+β1(LDISP_DNIit)+β2(LDISP_DOCIit)+β3(LDISP_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR03it )+ FEi + YEt + εit

PANEL A
Variable

Exp.
Sign
Constant
?
&
LDISP_DNI
+
&
LDISP_DOCI
+
LDISP_OTH&
?
LSUR
+
INST
LCAR03
+
Year & Firm Effects
N
Groups
Wald-sig
Wald-stat
R2(within)

Est.
Coef.
2.8736
0.9588
3.0880
-0.3749
0.2807
0.6982
0.7285

AV03TS
p-value
0.166
0.720
0.005***
0.051*
0.172
0.468
0.009***
Included
233
51
0.0000
80.22
0.1770

Boot.
p-value#
0.143
0.835
0.315
0.069*
0.187
0.525
0.009***

Est.
Coef.
0.0111
0.0146
0.0197
0.0000
0.0008
-0.0041
0.0012

AV03FE
p-value
0.016**
0.062*
0.173
0.929
0.080*
0.283
0.025**
Included
233
51
0.0002
38.43
0.2100

0.0000
49.80
0.1770

Boot.
p-value#
0.010***
0.234
0.221
0.924
0.049**
0.300
0.019**

0.0006
35.75
0.2100

Est.
Coef.
0.0029
0.0036
0.0053
-0.0001
0.0001
-0.0006
0.0005

AV03DF
p-value

Boot.
p-value#
0.061*
0.071*
0.074*
0.224
0.049** 0.091*
0.626
0.641
0.327
0.293
0.542
0.567
0.003*** 0.005***
Included
233
51
0.0000
72.30
0.1723

# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.
&
LDISP_DNI and LDISP_DOCI are the portions of LDISP predicted by the regression in Table 10
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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0.0001
42.20
0.1723

TABLE 10 (cont)
Panel B: Relationship Between Predicted Dispersion and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H1c)
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal
volume measures on the levels of dispersion predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (LDISP_DNI and LDISP_DOCI).
The results reported here are for the 7-day announcement window statistics. The table also reports the p-values associated
with the bootstrap method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings
surprise, institutional holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects.

^

^

^

AVit=β0+β1(LDISP_DNIit)+β2(LDISP_DOCIit)+β3(LDISP_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR07it )+ FEi + YEt + εit

PANEL B
Variable

Exp.
Sign
Constant
?
&
LDISP_DNI
+
&
LDISP_DOCI
+
LDISP_OTH&
?
LSUR
+
INST
LCAR07
+
Year & Firm Effects
N
Groups
Wald-sig
Wald-stat
R2(within)

Est.
Coef.
2.4943
-4.6189
1.6677
-0.4453
0.5300
1.9443
0.6183

AV07TS
p-value
0.380
0.259
0.627
0.135
0.078*
0.377
0.115
Included
233
51
0.0000
58.09
0.1686

Boot.
p-value#
0.364
0.515
0.816
0.222
0.113
0.347
0.095*

Est.
Coef.
0.0179
0.0162
0.0291
0.0003
0.0012
-0.0063
0.0018

AV07FE
p-value
0.003***
0.166
0.303
0.773
0.072*
0.358
0.015**
Included
233
51
0.0000
52.12
0.1530

0.0001
41.80
0.1686

Boot.
p-value#
0.002***
0.353
0.392
0.762
0.100*
0.287
0.008***

0.0001
40.27
0.1530

Est.
Coef.
0.0013
0.0007
0.0029
0.0000
0.0001
-0.0005
0.0002

AV07DF
p-value
0.135
0.551
0.205
0.704
0.321
0.513
0.027**
Included

Boot.
p-value#
0.149
0.703
0.225
0.715
0.343
0.493
0.027**

223
51
0.0000
53.34
0.1030

# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.
&
LDISP_DNI and LDISP_DOCI are the portions of LDISP predicted by the regression in Table 10.
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

80

0.0004
37.43
0.1030

Hypothesis H2c deals with the relationship between abnormal trading volume and
the portion of ∆DISP predicted by DNI and DOCI. Table 11 shows the results of this
examination. This model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 20.00 percent of the
variation in AV03TS. Consistent with my hypothesis, the portions of ∆DISP predicted by
DNI (∆DISP_DNI) and DOCI (∆DISP_DOCI) both have positive estimated coefficients.
Only the portion predicted by DOCI (∆DISP_DOCI) is significant (p<.05). This means
that a one percent increase in the portion of ∆DSIP predicted by DNI is associated with a
193.2947 unit change in the AV03TS abnormal volume measure. The extreme coefficient
is the result of a very small coefficient on the base regression (equation 11, Table 9) and
the dependent variable in this model being a lognormal value. The portion of ∆DISP not
explained by derivative income (∆DISP_OTH) shows a positive and significant (p<.05)
coefficient. This means that a unit increase in the change in dispersion not related to
derivative income is associated with a 4.0909 unit increase in AV03TS. LCAR03 is also
significant (p<.05) with an estimated coefficient of 0.6575. A one percent increase in the 3day cumulative abnormal return is associated with a 0.6575 unit increase in AV03TS. Only
the significance of LCAR03 is retained through the bootstrap estimation.
The same regression model is estimated with AV03FE as the measure of abnormal
volume. This model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 21.80 percent of the
variation in the dependent variable. As predicted both ∆DISP_DNI and ∆DISP_DOCI
have positive estimated coefficients. However, only ∆DISP_DNI is significant (p<.1) with
an estimated coefficient of 0.1339. This means that a one percent increase in the amount of
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∆DISP explained by DNI is associated with an increase in abnormal volume equal to 13.39

percent of shares outstanding. As with the previous model, the magnitude of this
coefficient is the result of the small coefficient in regression (equation 11, Table 9).
Coefficient estimates for LSUR and LCAR03 are both positive and significant at
conventional levels. None of the 7-day window abnormal volume measures show
significance.
None of the variables of interest retain significance through the bootstrapping
method. Under the normally obtained standard errors and p-values, hypothesis H2c would
find support in all three of the 3-day window models. None are significant under the
bootstrap method. Therefore, hypothesis H2c is not supported. There is insufficient
evidence to conclude that the portion ∆DISP predicted by SFAS 133 income effects has
explanatory power for abnormal volume. The lack of significance in the model likely
reflects that, while information was successfully transferred into the second model, it
lacked sufficient precision to be detected. Use of a more precise mechanism for
transferring the information from the primary model to the secondary model might provide
significant results.
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TABLE 11
Panel A: Relationship Between Predicted Change in Dispersion and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H2c)
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal volume
measures on the levels of change in dispersion predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (∆DISP_DNI and ∆DISP_DOCI).
The results reported here are for the 3-day announcement window. The table also reports the p-values associated with the
bootstrap method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings surprise,
institutional holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects.

^

^

^

AVit=β0+β1(∆DISP_DNIit)+β2(∆DISP_DOCIit)+β3(∆DISP_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR03it )+ FEi + YEt + εit

PANEL A
Variable

Exp.
Sign
Constant
?
&
+
∆DISP_DNI
&
+
∆DISP_DOCI
?
∆DISP_OTH&
LSUR
+
INST
LCAR03
+
Year & Firm Effects
N
Groups
Wald-sig
Wald-stat
R2(within)

Est.
Coef.
3.2978
11.6406
193.2947
4.0909
0.1501
0.9824
0.6575

AV03TS
p-value
0.119
0.647
0.011**
0.049**
0.298
0.315
0.017**
Included
223
51
0.0000
67.07
0.2000

Boot.
p-value#
0.104
0.807
0.289
0.172
0.345
0.399
0.013**

Est.
Coef.
0.0114
0.1339
1.1727
0.0071
0.0009
-0.0048
0.0011

AV03FE
p-value

Boot.
p-value#
0.015** 0.013**
0.082*
0.243
0.162
0.212
0.072*
0.220
0.007*** 0.013**
0.208
0.198
0.033
0.050**
Included
223
51
0.0001
40.34
0.2180

0.0000
43.54
0.2000

0.0003
37.54
0.2180

Est.
Coef.
0.0030
0.0328
0.3264
0.0023
0.0001
-0.0007
0.0005

AV03DF
p-value
0.056*
0.076*
0.050*
0.009***
0.141
0.471
0.004***
Included
223
51
0.0000
53.44
0.1779

# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.
&
∆DISP_DNI and ∆DISP_DOCI are the portions of ∆DISP predicted by the regression in Table 10.
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Boot.
p-value#
0.055*
0.264
0.103
0.048**
0.175
0.526
0.006***

0.0000
43.08
0.1779

TABLE 11 (cont)
Panel B: Relationship Between Predicted Change in Dispersion and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H2c)
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal volume
measures on the levels of change in dispersion predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (∆DISP_DNI and ∆DISP_DOCI).
The results reported here are for the 7-day announcement window. The table also reports the p-values associated with the
bootstrap method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings surprise,
institutional holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects.

^

^

^

AVit=β0+β1(∆DISP_DNIit)+β2(∆DISP_DOCIit)+β3(∆DISP_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR07it )+ FEi + YEt + εit

PANEL B
Variable

Exp.
Sign
Constant
?
&
+
∆DISP_DNI
&
+
∆DISP_DOCI
?
∆DISP_OTH&
LSUR
+
INST
LCAR07
+
Year & Firm Effects
N
Groups
Wald-sig
Wald-stat
R2(within)

Est.
Coef.
3.3834
-36.8480
100.1900
8.2189
0.4646
2.3313
0.5671

AV07TS
p-value

Boot.
p-value#
0.229
0.230
0.336
0.616
0.638
0.797
0.003*** 0.022**
0.065*
0.072*
0.287
0.284
0.147
0.154
Included
223
51
0.0000
57.96
0.1686

Est. Coef.
0.0180
0.1461
1.7956
0.0107
0.0015
-0.0075
0.0018

AV07FE
p-value

Boot.
p-value#
0.002*** 0.002***
0.164
0.339
0.308
0.356
0.168
0.245
0.003*** 0.013**
0.270
0.258
0.012** 0.011**
Included
223
51
0.0003
54.10
0.1562

0.0001
42.70
0.1686

0.0000
42.72
0.1562

Est.
Coef.
0.0014
0.0065
0.1785
0.0020
0.0001
-0.0005
0.0002

AV07DF
p-value

Boot.
p-value#
0.101
0.093*
0.515
0.688
0.206
0.253
0.001*** 0.021**
0.102
0.170
0.472
0.469
0.030** 0.061**
Included
223
51
0.0000
45.46
0.1080

# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.
&
∆DISP_DNI and ∆DISP_DOCI are the portions of ∆DISP predicted by the regression in Table 10.
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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0.0004
36.93
0.1080

Hypothesis H3c deals with the relationship between abnormal trading volume and
the portion of JUMB predicted by DNI and DOCI. Table 12 shows the results of this
examination. In Panel A the results for the models using the 3-day abnormal volume
measures are reported. The first model, using AV03TS as the abnormal volume measure is
significant at the p<.001 level and explains 32.66 percent of the variation in AV03TS.
However, this model fails to show significance for the variables of interest.
Also shown in Panel A of Table 12 are the results for the model using AV03FE as
the dependent variable. This model is significant and the p<.01 level and explains
approximately 22.8 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. In this model, the
estimated coefficients on the variables of interest are positive and significant. The
estimated coefficient on the portion of JUMB related to DNI (JUMB_DNI) is 0.41 percent
and is significant at the p<.05 level. A percentage increase in the degree of analysts’
reordering related to DNI is associated with an increase in the abnormal trading volume
equal to 0.41 percent of shares outstanding. The estimated coefficient on the portion of
JUMB related to DOCI (JUMB_DOCI) is 0.3616 percent and is significant at the p<.05
level. A percentage increase in the degree of analysts’ reordering related to DOCI is
associated with an increase in the abnormal trading volume equal to 36.16 percent of
shares outstanding. LCAR03 is also significant (p<.05) with an estimated coefficient of
0.30 percent. The JUMB_DOCI variable survives the bootstrap procedure and remains
significant at the p<.1 level.
Panel A of Table 12 also shows the results for the model using AV03DF as the
dependent variable. This model is significant and the p<.01 level and explains
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approximately 21.74 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. In this model, the
estimated coefficients on the variables of interest are positive and significant. The
estimated coefficient on the portion of JUMB related to DNI (JUMB_DNI) is 0.10 percent
and is significant at the p<.01 level. A percentage increase in the degree of analysts’
reordering related to DNI is associated with an increase in the abnormal trading volume
equal to 0.10 percent of shares outstanding. The estimated coefficient on the portion of
JUMB related to DOCI (JUMB_DOCI) is 5.51 percent and is significant at the p<.01 level.
A percentage increase in the degree of analysts’ reordering related to DOCI is associated
with an increase in the abnormal trading volume equal to 5.51 percent of shares
outstanding. LCAR03 is also significant (p<.01) with an estimated coefficient of 0.11
percent. A one percent increase in the cumulative abnormal 3-day return is associated with
a 0.11 percent increase in AV03DF. The JUMB_DNI variable survives the bootstrap
procedure and remains significant at the p<.1 level.
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TABLE 12
Panel A: Relationship Between Predicted Jumbling and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H3c)
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal
volume measures on the levels of jumbling predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (JUMB_DNI and JUMB_DOCI).
The results reported here are for the 3-day announcement window. The table also reports the p-values associated with the
bootstrap method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings surprise,
institutional holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects.

^

^

^

AVit=β0+β1(JUMB_DNIit)+β2(JUMB_DOCIit)+β3(JUMB_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR03it )+ FEi + YEt + εit

PANEL A
Variable

Exp.
Sign
Constant
?
&
JUMB_DNI
+
JUMB_DOCI&
+
&
JUMB_OTH
?
LSUR
+
INST
LCAR03
+
Year & Firm Effects
N
Groups
Wald-sig
Wald-stat
R2(within)

Est.
Coef.
8.2701
0.4762
1.7998
0.6257
-0.2343
-0.8534
1.4535

AV03TS
p-value

Boot.
p-value#
0.065*
0.004***
0.347
0.604
0.379
0.751
0.076*
0.066**
0.354
0.427
0.638
0.671
0.005*** 0.013**
Included
92
37
0.0000
52.12
.3266

Est.
Coef.
0.0235
0.0041
0.3161
0.0008
-0.0003
-0.0110
0.0030

AV03FE
p-value
0.035**
0.013**
0.027**
0.355
0.529
0.159
0.025**
Included
92
37
0.0048
29.96
0.2282

0.0062
29.19
0.3266

Boot.
p-value#
0.036**
0.107
0.083*
0.441
0.623
0.143
0.044**

0.0265
15.71
0.2282

Est.
Coef.
0.0071
0.0010
0.0551
0.0004
-0.0002
-0.0019
0.0011

AV03DF
p-value

Boot.
p-value#
0.058*
0.047**
0.007*** 0.058**
0.004*** 0.181
0.097
0.135
0.096
0.193
0.257
0.299
0.004*** 0.009***
Included
92
37
0.0000
100.46
0.2174

# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.
&
JUMB_DNI and JUMB_DOCI are the portions of JUMB predicted by the regression in Table 10.
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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0.0045
30.13
0.2174

TABLE 12 (cont)
Panel B: Relationship Between Predicted Jumbling and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H3c)

This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal volume
measures on the levels of jumbling predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (JUMB_DNI and JUMB_DOCI). The results
reported here are for the 7-day announcement window. The table also reports the p-values associated with the bootstrap
method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings surprise, institutional
holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects.

^

^

^

AVit=β0+β1(JUMB_DNIit)+β2(JUMB_DOCIit)+β3(JUMB_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR07it )+ FEi + YEt + εit

PANEL B
Variable

Exp.
Sign
Constant
?
JUMB_DNI&
+
JUMB_DOCI&
+
JUMB_OTH&
?
LSUR
+
INST
LCAR07
+
Year & Firm Effects
N
Groups
Wald-sig
Wald-stat
R2(within)

Est.
Coef.
8.4984
0.2952
-3.1403
1.1589
-0.0966
1.2162
1.2248

AV07TS
p-value
0.153
0.796
0.947
0.164
0.842
0.766
0.040*
Included
92
37
0.0024
32.00
0.2027

Boot.
p-value#
0.204
0.899
0.984
0.184
0.858
0.798
0.134

Est.
Coef.
0.0297
0.0046
0.0588
0.0005
-0.0004
-0.0178
0.0031

AV07FE
p-value

Boot.
p-value#
0.003*** 0.009***
0.180
0.364
0.075*
0.069*
0.732
0.793
0.670
0.736
0.189
0.199
0.018** 0.097*
Included
92
37
0.0019
32.70
0.2936

0.0135
26.75
0.2027

0.0796
20.68
0.2163

Est.
Coef.
0.0030
0.0002
0.0299
0.0002
-0.0002
-0.0008
0.0005

AV07DF
p-value
0.065*
0.514
0.071*
0.239
0.126
0.580
0.001***
Included

Boot.
p-value#
0.051**
0.596
0.186
0.274
0.208
0.595
0.013**

92
37
0.0000
59.96
0.1988

# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.
&
JUMB_DNI and JUMB_DOCI are the portions of JUMB predicted by the regression in Table 10.
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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0.0065
29.01
0.1988

All of the 7-day window models are significant overall; however, only one model
indicates significance on the variables of interest. The model using AV07FE as the
dependent shows a positive and significant (p<.1) coefficient on JUMB_DOCI. A
percentage increase in the degree of analysts’ reordering related to DOCI is associated with
an increase in the abnormal trading volume equal to 5.88 percent of shares outstanding.
This effect retains significance (p<.1) through the bootstrap procedure. The loss of
significance relative to the other abnormal volume measures likely reflects that, while
information was successfully transferred into the second model, it lacked sufficient
precision to be detected. An improved mechanism for transferring the information from the
primary model to the secondary model may yield significant results.
Both hypothesis H1c and H3c find support in the original estimation method and
maintain, albeit weaker, support after the appropriate standard errors are estimated.
Hypothesis H2c fails to find support through the bootstrap estimation. In all cases, the
fixed-effect and difference-in-differences abnormal volume measures are more powerful in
detecting the effect than the abnormal volume from the time-series estimation method.
There is evidence to support the assertion that the income effects of SFAS 133 have
explanatory power for abnormal volume by way of the LDISP and JUMB heterogeneity
measures. Both prior dispersion heterogeneity (LDISP) and the differential interpretation
heterogeneity (JUMB) are positively associated with SFAS 133 income measures. The
portion of the two measures predicted by the SFAS 133 measures are also significantly
related to observed abnormal trading volume.
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Supplemental analysis:
For each of the models expressed in equations 19, 20, and 21, I test for interactions
effects between the variables of interest and the control variables (LSUR, INST, LCAR03,
and LCAR07). None of the interactions is significant in explaining variability in abnormal
volume.
Finally, I also test H1c, H2c, and H3c using the alternative computations for LDISP
and ∆DISP described earlier. I use the analysts’ forecast standard deviation and mean
provided by I/B/E/S to recomputed LDISP and ∆DISP. The results obtained from the
alternative LDISP and ∆DISP measures are consistent with the results reported here.
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V Conclusions
Using a sample of 51 banking organizations, I examine four measures of belief
heterogeneity surrounding earnings announcements by firms utilizing derivatives for
hedging purposes. Due to the underlying complexity of both derivatives and the accounting
treatment prescribed by the SFAS 133 standard, I expect that investors may have differing
interpretations of the newly provided information. Generally, I hypothesize that the income
effects arising from the fair-value accounting for derivatives (SFAS 133) are associated
with an increase in differing beliefs among individuals.
I find that the income effects of SFAS 133 are significantly related to belief
heterogeneity among investors. The net income and other comprehensive income effects of
SFAS 133 are significantly related to increasing levels of abnormal trading volume
surrounding earnings announcements. Additionally, the level of SFAS 133 net income is
significantly and positively associated with three measures of belief heterogeneity derived
from analysts’ forecasts. In an extended analysis I model the SFAS 133 income effects on
abnormal volume using the three belief heterogeneity measures as the conduit. I find
support for two of the three heterogeneity measures acting as a conduit for the effect of the
income measures on abnormal volume. This result was only found on the fixed-effect and
difference-in-differences estimates of abnormal volume.
Also in an examination of banking organizations, Ahmed et al., (2006) show that
the fair-value recognition of derivatives is value relevant. Further, they demonstrate that
changes in the levels of fair-value recognition are relevant to equity returns. Their findings
91

show that the recognition of derivatives at fair value is meaningful in establishing the
market equilibrium price. The results of this study, taken together with Ahmed et al.,
(2006), indicate that the SFAS 133 compliant financial information generates
heterogeneity of beliefs while at the same time providing value relevant information.
While the reporting of recognized derivatives is value relevant in establishing the
aggregate belief in the market, the income effects of the same standard cause the aggregate
belief to be based on a weaker consensus.
Practitioners should find these results relevant when evaluating the effect of fairvalue recognition on market participants. To the extent that differential beliefs and
differential interpretations surrounding the reported fair-value information expand and
persist over time, standard setters may need to reconcile this market reaction with the
underlying purpose of adopting fair-value accounting standards. Accounting researchers
may find the results informative for applying a more appropriate standard error estimation
technique when generated regressors are employed.
I make several contributions to the literature. First, I employ abnormal trading
volume as a tool to examine the effect of derivative fair-value accounting on belief
heterogeneity in the market. Second, I relate abnormal volume and three measures of belief
heterogeneity to the income effects of SFAS 133. Third, I model the relationship between
the portions of the three measures of belief heterogeneity attributable to SFAS 133 income
and observed abnormal volume. Fourth, I demonstrate the necessity of applying an
alternative standard error estimation procedure when hypotheses are tested in a model with
generated regressors.
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Limitations:
The results of this study may not be broadly generalizable. First, the sample in this
study is restricted to regulated, banking organizations. Second, the study is based on a
limited sample of 223 firm-years observations representing 51 firms.
As with most archival market studies, several threats to validity are present. Several
external events occurred proximal to the initial announcement dates of SFAS 133
compliant results. Specifically, the effects of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack cannot
be fully assessed nor captured in a model. While the first earnings announcements for
financial results compliant with SFAS 133 were not issued until mid January 2002, the
lingering effect of the turmoil and passage of the Patriot Act cannot be dismissed. Second,
Regulation FD was adopted by the SEC on August 15, 2000. This regulation required that
any disclosure made to any group of users (in particular following analysts) must be made
readily available to all users in a public forum or media. In response, firms may have made
more information available to a broader base of investor. Third, in June 2000, FASB issued
SFAS 138. As a result, the effect of SFAS 138 is temporally linked to the valuation and
income effects of SFAS 133.
Opportunities for Future Research:
One further exploration dealing with the volume and price reactions around SFAS
133 compliant earnings announcements is in the identification and measurement of
announcement specific characteristics. These announcement specific characteristics may
influence the relationships explored here. Components of net income and other
comprehensive income can be expected to influence the strength of the heterogeneity
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relationship to income measures. The smoothness (or volatility) of earnings along with
levels of disclosure in general may also be an important factors. In this study, I examine
the total income and other comprehensive income effect of all derivatives. Future research
into the specific types of derivative hedging activity (i.e. cash flow, fair value, and foreign
exchange) should be explored. As each of these derivatives strategies have different uses
and implications for the firms’ financial position and future cash flows, differing levels of
each may have an effect on heterogeneity.
Alternative measures of information asymmetry should also be examined. For
example, bid-ask and credit yields have been identified in the literature as market measures
reflecting differing views about risk and uncertainty. Utilization of these alternative
measures provides two significant benefits. First, a significant portion of the 276 firm-year
observations lost due to insufficient analysts’ following could be recovered into the
sample. Second, these alternative measures could be used to test the robustness of the
results reported here.
Examination of the level of observed heterogeneity over time should also be
explored. Specifically, the question as to whether the market participants learn over time
how to build the effects of the new standard into expectations, and if that is observed as a
reduction in observed heterogeneity.
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APPENDIX A
Variable Definitions – Income Measures and Abnormal Trading Volume

Variable

Title

Units/Form

Definition/Computation

Income Measures
DNI
Derivative Net Income

Dollars per share

Per share before tax net income arising from SFAS-133

DOCI

Derivative OCI

Dollars per share

Per share other comprehensive income (gross of tax effect)
arising from SFAS-133

NDNI

Non-Derivative Net
Income

Dollars per share

Per share before tax net income excluding effect of SFAS-133

NDOCI

Non-Derivative OCI

Dollars per share

Per share other comprehensive income (gross of tax effect)
excluding effect of SFAS-133

Abnormal Trading Volume Measures
AV03TS /
Time Series estimation of No units specified
(AV07TS)
abnormal trading volume
for 3-day (7-day)
window
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Difference between the log of actual trading volume during the
announcement period and the log of estimated normal trading
volume during the announcement period (3 and 7 day). The
difference is divided by the standard deviation of the residuals
from the time-series regression. Normal trading volume is
estimated with a first order autoregressive model where the log
of the percent of firm shares traded is the dependent variable,
and is regressed on the contemporaneous percent of market
shares traded. The non-announcement period used in the
estimation begins 50 days prior to announcement date and
ends 10 days prior to the announcement date.

APPENDIX A (cont)
Variable Definitions – Abnormal Trading Volume

Variable

Title

Abnormal Trading Volume Measures –cont.
AV03FE /
Firm effect estimation of
(AV07FE)
abnormal trading volume
for 3-day (7day) window

AV03DF /
(AV07DF)

Difference in Differences
estimation of abnormal
trading volume for 3-day
(7-day) window

Units/Form

Definition/Computation

% of shares

Difference between actual trading volume during the
announcement period and estimated normal trading volume
during the announcement period (3 and 7 day). Normal trading
volume is estimated with cross-sectional panel data using both
firm effects and year effects. The parameters are estimated
over the non-announcement period beginning 50 trading days
prior to announcement and ending 10 days prior to
announcement. The estimated parameters are then used to
estimate normal volume through the announcement period.

% of shares

Difference between firm excess trading volume and market
excess trading volume during the announcement period (3 and
7 day windows). Firm excess trading volume is computed as
the percent of shares traded over the announcement period less
the percent of shares traded over the non-announcement
period. Market excess trading volume is computed in the same
way with the same announcement and non-announcement
periods. The announcement period begins 50 trading days
prior to announcement and ends 10 days prior to
announcement.
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APPENDIX A (cont)
Variable Definitions – Heterogeneity Measures

Variable

Title

Units/Form

Heterogeneity Measures
LDISP
Prior Dispersion

Definition/Computation

Natural log of the standard deviation of analysts forecasts
issued within 30 days prior to the earnings announcement
divided by the mean forecast

∆DISP

Change in Dispersion

Standard deviation of analysts forecasts issued within 45 days
of earnings announcement less standard deviation of analysts
forecasts issued within 30 days prior to earnings
announcement divided by the pre-announcement mean forecast

JUMB

Jumbling

Natural log of 1.1 minus the non-parametric correlation
coefficient of the rank order of analysts forecasts prior to
earnings announcement and post earnings announcement
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APPENDIX A (cont)
Variable Definitions – Control Variables

Variable

Title

Units/Form

Definition/Computation

Control Variables
LSUR
Earnings surprise

ln(per share)

Natural log of the absolute value of the difference between the
mean analyst forecast and actual EPS, divided by the mean
analysts forecast

INST

Institutional Holdings

% of shares

FVD

Fair Value of Hedge
Derivatives

per share

Shares held by institutions at end of reporting period divided
by shares outstanding at end of reporting period.
Gross amount of fair value of derivatives per share.

LCAR03 /
(LCAR07)

3-day (7-day) window
abnormal returns

ln(CAR)
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CAR is computed by estimating the normal return against
market return for the period beginning 50 days prior to
announcement and ending 10 days prior to announcement. The
estimated parameters from that regression are used to forecast
normal returns through the announcement period. The
difference between actual daily return and predicted normal
return are summed over the 3-day (7-day) announcement
period.
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